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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This empirical study constructs a new instrument for measuring the geopolitical potential of 
South Asian countries, and investigates its role in influencing the bilateral aid and 
multilateral aid decisions directed to the South Asian region during the post-Cold War period 
(1991-2013). The study observes a polynomial relationship between the geopolitical potential 
and bilateral aid from DAC donors. Moreover, the strategic or geopolitical interests of main 
DAC donors have been found significant not only during the War on Terror period, but over 
the entire period. Therefore, the bilateral aid especially from DAC donors has never been 
disassociated from geopolitics during the post-Cold War period, either; it was strongly 
influenced by recipients’ geopolitical potential or donors’ geopolitical interests. Similarly, 
the bilateral aid from Non-DAC donors and multilateral aid have also been found to be 
significantly influenced by the geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients. Furthermore, 
evidence is found to support the contention that the lending decisions by multilateral bodies 
are influenced by the main DAC donors.  
 
Keywords: Geostrategic Importance, Geopolitical Potential, Foreign Aid, DAC donors, Non-
DAC donors. 
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CHAPTER I  
 INTRODUCTION 
The effectiveness of aid in terms of its impact on economic well-being has remained 
disputed. Interlinked with this question is the question of what motivates this aid. That is, to 
what extent is the donation of aid motivated by geopolitics (and other self-interested 
concerns) and to what extent is it motivated by altruistic considerations? Foreign aid, from 
the perspective of its objectives, has passed through various stages since the beginning of the 
last century. In the first half of last century, the four main reasons identified were 
humanitarian relief, development, diplomacy, and commerce. However, the second half also 
included secondary objectives like promotion or expansion of donors’ language, culture or 
religion. 1 Governments have long provided subsidies, grants, bribes, and other transfers 
connected to commercial and diplomatic interests including international security, strategic 
and political motives, but the transfer of the concessional public resources aimed to raise 
development, is a ‘twentieth-century innovation’, and a new phenomenon in relations 
between countries.’2  
The recipients’ needs and donors’ motives have been addressed in a number of studies 
carried out on aid selection and allocation. The literature reveals that aid has been greatly 
used by donors for their ideological, economic, political and strategic interests. Studies3 
focusing on the Cold War period have clearly found the significance of strategic interests of 
main donors along with other prime economic and political factors. Some witnessed that the 
overwhelming strategic interests lost their potential by the end of Cold War, but recent 
studies have observed the re-emergence of strategic and political interests in the aid 
allocation process since the start of the War on Terror.  
Most of the studies attempted to determine the strategic or geopolitical interests of 
donors, used a large amount of variables to explain the strategic role of aid disbursed by 
donors 4 . Conversely, this study ties the literature of strategic interests of donors with 
recipients’ strategic importance. We argue that the donors’ vested interests actually respond 
                                                 
1 Lancaster (2008) 
2 Ibid 
3 Ball & Johnson, 1996; Meernik et al., 1998; Lai, 2003; Berthelemy & Tichit, 2004; Dunning, 2004; Moss et al., 2005; 
Boschini & Olofsgard, 2007; Fleck & Kilby, 2010. 
4 McKinlay & Little, 1977; 1978; Hess, 1989; Ball & Johnson, 1996; Schraeder et al., 1998; Meernik et al., 1998; Boschini 
& Olofsgard, 2007. 
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to the geopolitical potential of recipients. Countries with high values of geopolitical potential 
are preferred by donors than countries with low geopolitical potential.  
This study gathers and rearranges different ideas to construct a new instrument for 
measuring the ‘geopolitical potential’. The earlier literature considered the overall economic 
aid in exploring the motivations behind aid but recent studies have explored the varying 
behaviour of different donor groups, therefore, this study is organized to determine the 
behaviour of donors separately. This study examines the role of geopolitical potential in 
influencing the bilateral aid both from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members 
of Organization of Economics Cooperation for Development (OECD) and non-DAC donors5, 
as well as multilateral aid directed to the South Asian region.  
Applying factor analysis, we derived some important factors: geostrategic importance 
(mainly based upon geographical features, natural and man-made resources like 
infrastructure), external defence policy, political globalization and UN voting decisions 
explaining geopolitical potential of recipients on a mutual base. Further, we aggregate these 
factors based upon appropriate statistical methods to develop an index of geopolitical 
potential of South Asian economies. 
The experts on geopolitics or national power strongly point to the vital role of economic 
potential, population and recently acquired nuclear-capabilities in shaping national power. 
Since the literature on aid motivation has greatly used economic potential (economic growth 
or income) and population distinctly because of their important role in explaining supplies of 
aid. Therefore, we are observing these important determinants along with nuclear capabilities 
independently rather dissolving their particular significance in constructing index of 
geopolitical potential, based on common features. 
Reynaud and Vauday (2009) used factor analysis to determine the geopolitical 
significance of countries and found geopolitical potential playing an important role in shaping 
IMF lending decisions especially for non-concessional loans. This study extends the 
empirical literature on the strategic role of aid to further heights, giving a more 
comprehensive picture of the relationship between multiple donors and recipients. 
                                                 
5 See Appendix I for classification of bilateral donors into DAC and non-DAC groups (on page 104) 
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Overall, this study confirms the strong significance of geopolitical potential of South 
Asian countries in affecting aid decisions by DAC and Non-DAC donors, as well as by 
multilateral agencies. In the case of DAC donors, we observed a polynomial relationship 
between geopolitical potential and bilateral economic aid. This indicates that aid initially 
rises with a rise in geopolitical potential but later starts diminishing. The phase of increasing 
returns explains the mixed picture of geopolitical potential and socio-economic conditions 
while the diminishing pattern portrays the more powerful status of geopolitical potential and 
blurred face of socio-economic conditions. The geopolitical potential based upon 
geographical features, natural and man-made resources (particularly large infrastructure), and 
military capabilities makes it less likely to receive aid after reaching a certain height. This can 
be explained because of improvement in man-made resources, i.e., when a country develops 
certain sources to take advantage of its geography and natural resources, by developing a 
higher level of infrastructures. This stage may also indicate the disbursement of aid mainly on 
developmental objectives or based on donors’ geopolitical interests rather recipients’ 
potential. Further, it also shows a transition of a country from a recipient to a donor. 
We also observe a relationship between military assistance from the US and bilateral 
economic aid from DAC donors. The empirical findings suggest that the geopolitical 
potential attracts both the US military aid and DAC economic aid but the effect has been 
observed stronger in influencing economic aid than military aid. We also find that DAC 
economic aid follows military assistance from the US. The potential reason could be a gained 
strength in military capabilities due to military assistance which further raises geopolitical 
potential. This potential explanation has not been addressed in the literature though this is 
beyond the scope of this study, therefore, a separate study can be carried out to explore this 
link.  
The geopolitical potential of recipients during the War on Terror (WoT) has not been 
observed significant while the geopolitical interests of donors (measured by an alliance with 
the US during the WoT) have been observed quite important in shaping lending decisions by 
DAC donors. Hence, we argue that the DAC economic aid has always been influenced by 
geopolitics in our respective period, either the geopolitical potential of recipients or the 
donors’ geopolitical interests. 
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Similarly, the bilateral economic assistance from Non-DAC donors is also significantly 
influenced by the geopolitical potential of recipients. Generally, there is a positive 
relationship between geopolitical potential and aid disbursed by Non-DAC donors. We found 
some anomalies here, the countries with a very high geopolitical potential (like India and 
Pakistan) are given more aid compared to rest of the South Asian economies like Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, which appeared with negative intercepts in fixed effect estimations. The 
WoT period has not been observed significant in case of Non-DAC aid. On average, India 
received a negative aid from non-DAC sources since 1991 till 2013. This indicates less fresh 
flows than payments of existing loans. It may be likely due to India’s very high geopolitical 
potential relative to Non-DAC donors than DAC donors. Recently, India has also joined a 
club of donors. 
Our study confirms the findings of Reynaud and Vauday (2009) that multilateral aid 
from all sources (including IMF) has been significantly influenced by geopolitical potential. 
The relationship has been observed positive. Remarkably, the War on Terror period has been 
found important in shaping multilateral aid decisions, relative to its insignificance in case 
bilateral aid, both from DAC and Non-DAC donors. Further, the influence of geopolitical 
interests of main DAC donors has been observed significantly important in advancing 
multilateral aid. Comparatively, this study confirms that geopolitical potential of recipients 
affects more strongly than geopolitical interests of donors in multilateral aid decisions. 
Summing up, our study clearly identifies the strong influence of non-developmental 
objectives of aid disbursed by different donors to South Asian economies either based on 
significance of geopolitical potential of recipients or donors’ geopolitical interests. 
1.1 Aid to South Asia 
South Asia has been given preference in aid allocation but the question of motivation 
behind aid remains unsolved. The bilateral and multilateral aid flows to South Asia have 
always remained higher than Latin America but lesser than Africa region (see Figure 3). Why 
aid has been given to these two regions? Many aid scholars have attempted to identify the 
motivation behind aid directed to African and Latin American regions but no such attempt 
has been made on South Asian countries which share some common economic, social, 
political and governance problems. 
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Figure 1 exhibits the overall gradual rise and parallel movement of bilateral aid from 
DAC sources and multilateral aid to South Asian region. Both multilateral and bilateral aid 
remained very close till 2007 but ended up with divergence during the WoT. However, the 
bilateral aid flows from non-DAC sources have been fluctuating sharply over the period. 
Generally, three episodes of rising patterns of DAC aid can be observed between 1972 to 
1979; 1985 to 1990; and 2003 till 2010, with periods of overall fall connecting them.  
Figure 1: Bilateral (from DAC and Non-DAC Sources) and Multilateral Flows to South 
Asia (million US$) 
 
Source: OECD Aid Statistics (2014) 
Historically, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan have been the major bilateral 
aid donors to the South Asian economies: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Other major bilateral donors are Germany, France, and Australia. 
Japan, UK, and the US contribute almost two-third of the total bilateral aid disbursed by 
DAC members to South Asia and adding France and Germany makes it to 80 per cent (see 
Figure 2). India and Pakistan have been standing among the top aid recipients of US Aid for 
last four to five decades. Currently, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are major recipients in 
South Asia, sharing 83 per cent of the total flows of aid disbursed to the region (according to 
OECD Aid statistics, 2014). Similarly, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have always 
given importance in lending to some of the South Asian Economies like India and Pakistan. 
This raises concern why some of the South Asian countries fall in top aid-recipients? 
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Figure 2: Share of Bilateral Flows from DAC Sources and Share of South Asian Economies 
in Total Aid  
  
Source: OECD Aid Statistics (2014) 
1.2 Motivation 
The developmental effect of aid has remained disputed among researchers. Many scholars 
challenge the welfare impact of aid disbursement based upon the factors that motivate the 
donors and drive aid to developing countries from bilateral and multilateral channels. The 
literature reaches a consensus that aid has been greatly used by donors for their ideological, 
economic, political and strategic interests especially during the Cold War period. One stream 
of literature views that these interests gradually diminished afterwards and turned into more 
developmental objectives,6 while a second stream points out the re-emergence of strategic 
interests of donors especially since the War on Terror.7 Numerous studies have been carried 
out to investigate the aid allocation process and its impact on Latin American 8 and African9 
countries. There has been no significant study undertaken on South Asia regarding the aid 
disbursement. The few studies10 have been done in recent times regarding the impact of aid 
on South Asian economies that have always been given higher aid compared to Latin 
America (see Figure 3). 
                                                 
6 Ball & Johnson, 1996; Meernik et al., 1998; Lai, 2003; Berthelemy & Tichit, 2004; Dunning, 2004; Boschini & Olofsgard, 
2007.  
7 Moss et al., 2005; Fleck & Kilby, 2010. 
8 Baines, 1972; Kaplan, 1975; Fitch, 1979; Schoultz, 1981; Pach Jr., 1982; Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; McCormick 
and Mitchell, 1988; Gereffi, 1989; Gang and Lehman, 1990; Poe, 1991; 1992; Katada, 1997. 
9 Gulhati & Nallari, 1988; Ball & Johnson, 1996; Riddell, 1999; Goldsmith, 2001; Dunning, 2004; Stone, 2004; Harrigan et 
al., 2006; Travis, 2010. 
10 Asteriou, 2009; Bhavan et al., 2011. 
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The aid to South Asia has increased gradually over time, but less proportionately 
compared to Africa (see Figure 3 below). The flows of aid to South Asian region remained 
equal to African region till early 1970s. Later, the gap continued to widen as Africa starting 
receiving overall more aid than any other region. 
Figure 3: Regional Flows of Total Aid (million US$) 
       
Source: OECD Aid Statistics (2014) 
The South Asian regional countries have some common continuing economic and social 
problems like corruption, poor governance, economic and social disparity, ineffective 
institutional quality, and militarism. The well-being and standard of living, measured by 
human development index has always remained higher in South Asia compared to Africa (see 
Table 1) but some of the South Asian countries fall in top aid recipients. This catches further 
attention to determine the motivation behind aid allocation. 
Table 1: Human Development Index: South Asia versus Sub-Saharan Africa  
Regions 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2013 
South Asia 0.382 0.438 0.491 0.533 0.573 0.588 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.382 0.399 0.421 0.452 0.488 0.502 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014 Statistics) 
The developmental aid aims to reduce poverty in the long-run and supports the 
economic, environmental, political and social development of poor economies. If the aid had 
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been disbursed on developmental objectives then the economic problems of the region would 
have been resolved or reduced to a large extent, but some of the recipients’ economic 
situation has become worse. This point outs the ineffectiveness of aid partially due to the 
policies of both donors and recipients. The other strong argument is the greater fluctuation 
which exhibits the varying non-developmental interests and ‘shifting politics’ of donors over 
time. The aid fluctuation has remained quite substantial in case of South Asian economies, 
which raises questions about the non-development interests of donors and ineffectiveness of 
aid despite the contemporary economic and social problems of the region. 
The top ten poorest countries are Congo, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Liberia, Eritrea, Central 
African Republic, Niger, Malawi, Madagascar, and Afghanistan. If one considers the top ten 
aid recipients of US bilateral aid, would only find Afghanistan receiving foreign aid.11 This is 
again due to American interests in Afghanistan, their military presence during the War on 
Terror, and the reconstruction packages whereas the rest of these countries have not been 
given much preference. Equally, the multilateral agencies also prefer countries not on the 
basis of poverty but mainly on the political will of influential donors.  
This study builds on Reynaud & Vauday (2009), incorporates additional factors to 
determine the geopolitical potential that influences the flows of aid both from bilateral and 
multilateral sources during the post-Cold War period for the South Asian economies. The 
post-Cold war period is further decomposed into inter-war (1991-2000) and the War on 
Terror (2001-13) eras. Geopolitically motivated aid, and its role in promoting economic well-
being, has been given surprisingly little attention in the literature. In particularly, the War on 
Terror era has been largely ignored by economics-of-aid scholars. 
1.3 Geopolitics: A Brief Introduction 
 “Geopolitics is the science of conditioning of political processes by the earth. It is based 
on the broad foundation of geography, especially political geography, as the science of 
political space organisms and their structure. The essence of regions as comprehended from 
the geographical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics within which the 
course of political processes must proceed if they are to succeed in the long-term. Though 
                                                 
11 OECD Aid Statistics (2014) 
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political leadership will occasionally reach beyond this frame, the earth dependency will 
always eventually exert its determining influence.” (Haushofer et al., 1928) 
The term geopolitics is defined as ‘the study of the effects of geography (human and 
physical) on international politics and international relations’ (Devetak et al., 2012). 
Geopolitics represents the association between geographical space, power and strategic 
decision making. On one side, it entails the interaction of geographic space, natural and man-
made resources, and strategic dominance while on other hand, it involves the individual and 
collective interests developed by state and non-state actors. Further, it also incorporates the 
demographic elements, people factors, and international relations (Bronshtein, 2011). 
This term ‘geopolitics’ was developed by a Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellen, in 
1901. Later, it was theoretically structured into the international relations discipline by Karl 
Haushofer, during the rising interstate enmities in Europe, aimed to focus the determination 
of political power by space (Teschke, 2006). This term captured the concept of ‘territorial 
power struggle to strengthen political control over space’ till 1970s (Lacoste, 1993). This 
phenomenon involves three essential features cross-nationally: a bio-organic view of the 
state, a Social-Darwinist basis for international affairs, and the determination of political 
power from ‘spatio-natural’ factors. The primary Anglo-American geopolitical discourse 
believed in relative significance of land and sea power whereas the German notion focused 
on inter-state power interests, struggles and enmities in geographical space. 
Three different approaches of geopolitics have been discussed in literature namely the 
classical, critical, and feminist (anti-geopolitics). Classical geopolitics is founded on the 
principle of political objective from different geographical spaces or regions mainly by the 
Western countries, which sometimes has been observed as the ‘endeavour of elite white 
males’12.Critical geopolitics emerged from post-modernism, aimed at rejecting the theories 
sheltering the classical foundations of geopolitics and raised concerns and questions the 
contemporary geopolitical views of dominance and power across the regions. Feminist or 
anti-geopolitics, derived from ‘anti-politics’ which accounts for the political role of those 
who don’t like to be politicians, criticises both classical and critical geopolitical discourse. 
These all different streams of geopolitics are alive and interacting with each other (Flint, 
2011). We develop our empirical foundation of geopolitics mainly inspired by the ‘classical 
                                                 
12 Flint, Colin. (2011). Introduction to Geopolitics. First Edition, Routledge Publications, USA and Canada. 
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geopolitics’ by connecting the geographical space, power, and strategic political 
globalization. 
1.4 Geopolitical Potential of South Asian Countries 
The following figure 4 shows the geopolitical potential derived from factor analysis 
using factor loadings and respective variance explanation weightages approach for index 
construction. It is obvious that during our study period (from 1991 to 2013), India has shown 
a remarkable performance in raising its level of geopolitical potential compared to other 
countries. While Pakistan and Bangladesh show marginal improvement over time in their 
geopolitical potential. The detailed discourse can be found in analysis section. 
Figure 4: Geopolitical Potential of South Asian Economies 
 
Further, we also plot the averages of geopolitical potential and aid from different donors 
(as shown below in figure 5). The graph distinguishes India from rest of the South Asian 
countries due to its regional hegemonic role and highest geopolitical potential. The average 
plots indicate that India is less likely to receive further aid due to more powerful geopolitical 
potential relative to (bilateral) donors, blurred face of socio-economic problems, and the 
recent emerging role as a donor. Particularly, Indian geopolitical potential has reached certain 
height due to advancement in man-made resources by taking advantage of geography and 
natural resources, strengthening of military capabilities and political globalization, and its 
role in the United Nations. Others like Bangladesh and Pakistan still need greater progress to 
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further raise their geopolitical potential. Currently, they portray mix image of a geopolitical 
potential and adverse socio-economic conditions that keeps them in a phase of increasing aid.  
Figure 5 also distinguishes the relative capacity of donors with respect to height of 
geopolitical potential of recipients, phasing out the diminishing supplies of aid. Compared to 
DAC donors, the non-DAC donors have a low capacity to advance aid to South Asian 
economies. Therefore, we observe a low height of their trend line whereas the DAC donors 
(jointly) show highest response to geopolitical potential of recipients in terms of height of 
their aid loop, separating out the increasing and diminishing phases. 
Figure 5: Aid from different donors and Geopolitical Potential (Averages) 
 
1.5 Contribution 
The earlier studies have established a geopolitical role of foreign aid mainly from the 
donors’ perspective. This study empirically examines two dimensions of geopolitics, both 
from donors’ and recipients’ sides. We determine the role of geopolitical potential of South 
Asian recipients in aid allocation from bilateral sources, both from DAC and Non-DAC 
members, and multilateral agencies. The study designs an instrument to measure the 
geopolitical potential of recipients by gathering and systematic rearrangements of a variety of 
variables used in numerous studies, capturing more aspects pertinent to geostrategic 
importance, outward defence policy, international political alignment, and role in the United 
Nations (voting).  
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This study not only determines the significance of geopolitical potential but also 
identifies the diminishing effect of geopolitical potential on aid disbursed by DAC donors by 
observing a polynomial relationship. Further, along with geopolitical potential, we also 
observe the effect of geopolitical interests of DAC donors. The geopolitical potential has not 
been observed significant during the WoT whereas the donors’ geopolitical interests have 
been found quite important in influencing the aid during this period. Therefore, we argue that 
bilateral economic aid from DAC donors has always been influenced by geopolitics in post-
Cold War era, either the geopolitical potential of recipients or the geopolitical interests of 
donors. Overall, the effect of geopolitical potential of recipients has remained higher than 
geopolitical interests of DAC donors. This study also observes the role of geopolitical 
interests of main DAC donors in shaping multilateral aid. Notably, the effects of geopolitical 
potential of South Asian recipients and key DAC donors’ on multilateral aid have also been 
compared and analysed in this study. 
Moreover, this study, being first, connects the geostrategic importance, geopolitical 
potential, military aid, and economic aid. The geostrategic importance measures the power of 
states depending primarily upon geographic, natural and man-made resources including 
military capabilities. The military aid if influenced by geopolitics, would further be 
strengthening the military capabilities. This could raise the geostrategic importance again and 
eventually the geopolitical potential that may strongly influence the economic aid. 
Furthermore, the nuclear-geopolitics in South Asia has also been addressed with respect to 
WoT period. 
Terrorism, which has just been used in one study13, is incorporated as a potential control 
variable to determine the impact of domestic terrorism on aid during the War on Terror. This 
gauges whether only the vested interests of key donors are important to allocate aid (that is, 
aid as a response to the threat of terrorism). The earlier panel studies 14  witnessing the 
overwhelming strategic interests of donors did not pay attention to South Asia. This study 
explores the South Asian economies considering the inter-War and War on Terror periods 
after the re-emergence of aid as a ‘geopolitical tool’ by strong donors.  
                                                 
13 Dreher et al.  (2011) 
14 McKinlay & Little, 1978; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Ball & Johnson, 1996; Schraeder et al.,1998; Meernik et al., 1988; Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000; Burnside & Dollar, 2000;  McGillivray, 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Berthelemy & Tichit, 2007; Boschini & Olofsgard, 2007; 
Headey, 2008; Renynaud & Vauday, 2009; Fleck & Kilby, 2010; Dreher et al., 2011. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature differentiates the donors on the basis of aid objectives into two main groups: 
donors that primarily following development objectives and others tracking principally non-
development objectives. The development aid has had different focuses over time like 
‘modernization in 1950s and 1960s, basic human needs during 1970s and early 1980s, 
sustainable development and structural adjustment in 1990s, and human security’ since the 
start of this new century.  Empirical investigations of the aid objectivity of different donors 
provide mixed findings of different schools of thought: one group views that ideology, 
commercial, political and strategic interests are the primary determinants of aid, and other 
finds the humanitarian perspective dominant in explaining the foreign aid. 
Notwithstanding, many changes over the history of aid, one constant factor has been 
observed, “development objectives of aid programs have been distorted by the use of aid for 
donors’ commercial and political objectives” (Tarp and Hjertholm, 2000). The fundamental 
critics believe that it implicitly involves the Western control and expansion and denounce it 
for serving the ‘imperialism’ in modern times. Thus, number of studies analysing the aid 
allocation objectives develop a consensus that non-developmental factors have remained 
more important in influencing the aid allocations than developmental, though varied over 
time and among donors. 
2.1 Political Economy of Aid 
Studies on the political economy of aid reveal that the donor countries try to raise their 
influence on the international political platforms and achieve long-term political and 
economic interests by advancing foreign aid (Baldwin, 1966). Many studies conducted on the 
foreign aid determine that the donor interests weigh more than the recipient needs on the 
mechanism of aid allocation, particularly in case of bilateral aid (McKinlay and Little, 1978; 
1979; Maizles and Nissanke, 1984; Gang and Lehman, 1990; Cohen, 1995). 
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Foreign aid has been expanded mainly due to the geopolitical, commercial and other 
interests of donors, not due to humanitarian aspect (Jones et al., 2005; Browne, 2006). 
Maizels and Nissanke (1984) investigated the American, British, French, German and 
Japanese aid disbursed during 1960s and 1970s, and found that aid during such period was 
allocated in economic, political and security interests of donors. The business lobbies, 
especially the exporters, exert pressure on the government to shape the assistance package in 
tied form to increase the purchasing power of recipients which further raise the exports to the 
recipient countries (Tsoutsoplides, 1991; Vaubel, 1991; Morrissey, 1996; Oatley and Yackee, 
2000). Berthelemy (2006) found trade and commercial aspects stronger in explaining the 
foreign aid allocations by approving the link between the major trading partners and aid 
provisions. Ireland, Nordic region (except Finland) and Switzerland allocated aid mainly on 
humanitarian or developmental basis while France, Japan and UK advanced aid chiefly on 
non-development objectives.  
Studies examining the commercial motives of aid have found positive relationship 
between foreign aid and commercial interests with varied level of significance (Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello, 1985; Lebovic, 1988; McKinlay and Little, 1979; Meernik et al., 1998; Poe, 
1992; Travis, 1995). The rise in exports in donor countries strengthen the businesses and 
increase production which further lead to a rise in economic opportunities which make the 
voters, business lobbies, bureaucrats and government equally happy. 
The importance of external factors involved in designing aid policy has been highlighted 
in literature. During the Cold War, the United States foreign aid policy excluded the countries 
with which it had ideological differences in terms of economic and social systems (Poe, 
1991; Poe and Meernik, 1995; Travis, 1995, Sogge, 2002). Changes appearing in regimes or 
in power of political parties lead to changes in the foreign aid policy, affecting the flows of 
aid, and consequently these fluctuations adversely affect the economic growth of recipients 
(Bulir and Hamannn, 2003; Bulir and Lane, 2002; Eifert and Gelb; 2005; Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2000).  
Many of the earlier studies have also found the importance of recipients’ domestic 
features related to governance, law and order, population, income, openness, political 
structure and stability, political rights, civil liberties, internal and external conflict, violence, 
natural disasters, education and health conditions or human development index, fragile and 
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failed states to explain the aid allocation (Hess, 1989;  Schraeder et al., 1998; Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 2003; Berthelemy, 2006; Dollar & Levin, 
2006; Boschini & Olofsgard, 2007; Mesquita & Smith, 2007; Balla & Reinhardt, 2008; 
Headey, 2008; Younas, 2008; Clist, 2011; Dreher et al., 2011). 
2.2 Aid and Geopolitics 
The strategic and geopolitical interests of donors have been highlighted in the literature 
using a wide range of variables like military aid, allies at war, donor’s military presence in 
recipient, arms transfer from Soviet, Communist border, geographical location, distance from 
donors, arms sales, military expenditures, military force, mineral and energy resources, 
nuclear capabilities; language, religion, colonial history, and voting in favour of donors in 
United Nations General Assembly (Wittkopf, 1973; McKinlay & Little, 1978, 1979; Maizels 
& Nissanke, 1984;  Osterud, 1988; Ball & Johnson, 1996; Meernik et al., 1998; Schraeder et 
al., 1998; Mussa, 1999; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; McGillivray, 
2003; Neumayer, 2003a; Berthelemy, 2006; Boschini & Olofsgard, 2007; Mesquita & Smith, 
2007; Rose, 2007; Balla & Reinhardt, 2008; Headey, 2008; Reynaud & Vauday, 2009; Fleck 
& Kilby, 2010; Clist, 2011; Dreher et al., 2011). The wide range of geopolitical variables 
simultaneously explains the strategic importance of recipients as well as the donors’ interests. 
The colonial aspect of aid allocation has been found diminished in the post-Cold War period.  
The literature reached on a consensus that the strategic and geopolitical motives of 
donors have remained important in explaining aid allocation. Some studies witnessed that 
these interests have lost their potential since the end of Cold War (Ball & Johnson, 1996; 
Meernik et al., 1998; Lai, 2003; Berthelemy& Tichit, 2004; Dunning, 2004; Boschini & 
Olofsgard, 2007) but few found the re-emergence of strategic and geopolitical interests of 
donors after 9/11 during the War on Terror (Moss et al., 2005; Fleck & Kilby, 2010). 
Foreign aid has been greatly used by the United States as a policy instrument to raise its 
influence and to safeguard its own vested interests and of its allies as well. During the Cold 
War, the United States disbursed aid to Europe and developing countries to reduce the Soviet 
expansion and to help its allies (Meernik at al., 1998; Dunning, 2004; Boschini and 
Olofsgard, 2007). Before the end of the Cold War, the US aid was disbursed to allies and 
strategically important regimes (Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Later on, by the end of Cold 
 
 
17 
 
War, the US restructured its aid policy to counter ‘rogue’ states and to provide funds for 
development plans (Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Lai, 2003; Wright and Winters, 2010). The 
maintenance of internal stability, in political and law and order formats, has remained the 
significant part of US grand strategy to keep its allies network protected from security threats 
(Lake, 1999 and 2009). Since 9/11, the US aid policy has moved more towards countering 
terrorism threats to protect itself and its allies (Mueller, 2006, Ikenberry, 2011). Boutton and 
Carter (2014) found that alliance network is continued in US foreign policy after 9/11 while 
combating ‘transnational terrorism’, but the aid policy has placed less weight to the security 
of its allies than its own. 
2.3 Aid Effectiveness: An Overview 
On aid effectiveness front, the literature provides three different streams. One views that 
aid has a significantly positive effect on economic growth of recipients (Lensink and White, 
2000; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Clemens et al., 2004; Asteriou, 2009). The second stream views 
that aid positively contributes in economic growth conditional upon good economic policies, 
institutional effectiveness, good governance, colonial history, ideal geographical location, 
export price shocks and where the civil war just ended (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Durbarry 
et al., 1998; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Dalgaard et al., 2004; 
Roodman, 2004, Rajan and Subramanian, 2008) while the third stream contradicts with the 
earlier streams, by suggesting the negative effect of aid on economic growth of recipients by 
raising debt burden on poor economies, increasing the size of public sector leading to poor 
governance and corruption, and failure of domestic resource mobilization (Mosley, 1980; 
Dowling & Hiemenz, 1982; Boone, 1996; Radelet, 2006; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; 
Arellno et al., 2009).  
The growing literature on aid effectiveness also raises concerns about aid fluctuation 
which may affect the recipient governments’ expenditures and ultimately lead to instability of 
policies (Rodrik, 1990). The macroeconomic structure of recipients due to inconsistent 
investment plans and fiscal policies has been found to be affected by the fluctuations in 
foreign aid (Lensink & Morrisey, 2000; Mosley and Suleiman, 2007). Hudson and Mosley 
(2008) found that both the positive and negative volatilities in aid reduce its impact on 
economic growth. Positive aid volatility characterizes the sudden rise in aid, reducing its 
effectiveness, due to constraints on capacity of absorption while the negative volatility 
 
 
18 
 
represents the sudden fall in aid which reduces its effectiveness due to delays or termination 
of government plans and investment programs.  
The effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid addressed by scholars also provides 
mixed findings. Ram (2003) found bilateral aid more effective than multilateral aid. Headey 
(2008) found multilateral more effective during and after the Cold War while the bilateral aid 
has been found effective only in post-Cold War era. The Cold-War geopolitics and 
Washington consensus on World Bank lending decisions during 1980s, suggests to analyse 
the bilateral and multilateral aid allocation and their effectiveness separately in historical 
perspectives, i,e., Cold War and post-Cold War eras (White, 2002; Headey, 2008). 
2.4 Some Important Issues 
The important issues highlighted by the recent literature related to contemporary 
practices of aid allocation are the ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’. Aid is provided to 
selected economies of the donors’ choice, and not entirely on the demand of the recipients or 
on humanitarian and developmental purposes. For this reason, the researchers call it as an 
‘impure public good’ (Bobrow and Boyer, 2005), accrues mixed benefits to donors and 
recipients. Humanitarian and poverty driven factors have not been given much importance in 
case of many donors. Further, the bilateral and multilateral aid has remained volatile in many 
of the developing economies due to which it becomes difficult for the poor countries to 
achieve their targets of sustainable economic growth. The poor countries do not have an 
effective voice in aid system though they participate in DAC meetings now, but still they are 
ineffective. Historically, different major donors have had different disproportional weights of 
political, economic and strategic interests due to which their focus of development is still 
‘blurred’ as it has been found subserving the non-developmental objectives of donors. Aid 
policy nature has been stated, ‘baffling’, as different ideas and goals remained dominants at 
different times for different donors (Morgenthau, 1962). 
2.5 Literature Synthesis 
The literature has mostly viewed the geopolitical interests of donors through variety of 
variables but less impetus has been given to geopolitical potential of recipients. Our 
motivation is to fill this gap in literature. We argue that if the geopolitical interests of donors 
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have been found significant in influencing aid from donors in some countries or regions, it is 
due to something on part of recipients as well. Equally, it is the geopolitical potential of 
recipients that mainly attracts the aid and geopolitical interests of donors may further be 
attached to lending decisions. Summing up, the significance of either conditions of 
geopolitics indicates the stronger effect of non-developmental objectives of aid. 
A few studies have actually attempted to explore the geopolitical potential of recipients. 
Taking the geopolitics of foreign aid from either donor or recipients’ perspective is rare to 
observe in literature. Deriving motivation from a scare amount of literature, we organize this 
study based upon literature findings to develop a range of potential variables that can help to 
develop a measure of geopolitical potential of recipients. A detail discourse regarding 
geopolitics, its important implications, and measurement mechanism is given in methodology 
section. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This section covers the conceptual framework of measurement of geopolitical potential, 
methodological issues, research questions, and their corresponding empirical choices and 
relevant discussion. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework in terms of Schematic Diagram 
 
This study focuses the role of geopolitical potential in aid disbursement. The detailed version 
of role of geopolitical potential (measured by the interaction of geostrategic importance, 
outward defence policy, foreign relations and the UN voting decisions) in aid disbursement 
along with other prime factors outlined in the literature is shown below in a schematic 
diagram. 
Figure 6: Theoretical Framework of Geopolitical Potential and Aid Disbursement 
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3.2 Methodological Framework 
3.2.1 Research Design:  
Type of Research:  
The mode of research is quantitative in nature, that is, regression analysis is being applied for 
international panel data analysis. 
Time Horizon:  
This study mainly focuses on the period after the Cold War that is from 1991 till 2013, the 
phases of this period being the inter-War (1991-2000) and the War on Terror (2001-13). 
Data Collection Sources:  
The time series data will be taken from official and valid sources from various publications 
and reports like Economic Surveys, handbook of statistics of South Asian economies, World 
Development Indicators databank, Global Development Finance, Economic Intelligence Unit, 
Polity IV dataset, Freedom House, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Fact-book, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
UN Voting Call Data, Global Terrorism database, RAND World Terrorism database, Global 
Fire Power, State Bank reports, UN reports, US Energy Information Administration, US 
Green-book, World Nuclear Association, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Heritage 
Foundation, etc.  
Countries: 
This study considers only five countries of the South Asian region. The countries included in 
our analysis are: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Though we started with 
seven countries but missing data of Bhutan and Maldives over time led us to reduce our 
analysis to five countries only. Studies15 done on measuring the impact of aid on South Asian 
economies have also analysed these five countries due to same missing data problems for 
Bhutan and Maldives. 
 
                                                 
15 Asteriou, 2009; Bhavan et al., 2011. 
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3.3 Research Question: Methodological Frameworks 
What is the role of geopolitics in aid disbursement to South Asian economies from both 
bilateral sources and multilateral bodies with respect to the post-Cold War era? 
 
To explain this question, firstly, we respond to the elementary question of this research 
hypothesis to measure the geopolitical potential of South Asian economies. 
  
What constitutes the geopolitical potential particularly in context of South Asian 
economies? 
 
The literature on recipient needs and donor interests has transformed into ‘hybrid’ models, 
encompassing the leading features of both recipients and donors simultaneously. The donors’ 
political, economic, ideological and strategic interests have been found significant in many of 
the studies especially in the Cold War period. The recent studies have also witnessed the re-
emerging strategic interests of donors during the War on Terror (Fleck & Kilby, 2010).  
The literature determining the geopolitical potential of recipients used a variety of factors like 
measures of alliances, donors military presence, military expenditures, arms imports, voting 
in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), colonial affinity, geographical locations, 
bordering a security threat, trade or military relations with Communists, common religion and 
language, nuclear capabilities, energy and mineral resources, etc. But there is no consensus 
which of these factors is/are more important and best explain(s) the geopolitical potential of 
recipients and its likelihood to receive aid from donors.  
Geopolitical potential encompasses many features of geostrategic importance including the 
geography, infrastructure, military and nuclear capabilities, mineral and energy resources; 
outward defence policy or links; political globalization; and the UN voting decisions made by 
the recipients. Indeed, it is difficult to capture all of these areas related to geopolitical 
potential of recipients, as Baldwin (1979) stated ‘there’s no unique variable’. The intensity 
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and significance of variables related to geopolitical potential vary across recipients. Therefore, 
the concerned studies have used a variety of variables to determine the significance of 
different variables. Due to these problems, an index for geopolitical potential and its 
likelihood for aid allocation is a challenging task. 
The most commonly used variables related to recipients’ geopolitical or strategic importance 
are arms imports, military alliance, military aid, colonial history, and voting in the UNGA 
(Wittkopf, 1973; McKinlay and Little, 1977; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Ball and Johnson, 
1996; Meernik et al., 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
McGillivray, 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; Balla and Reinhardt, 
2008; Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Clist, 2011; Dreher et al., 2011). The military aid indicates the 
donors’ strategic interests but fails to determine the geopolitical importance of recipient in its 
absence, which means that there’s no geopolitical potential of a recipient if it is not given 
military aid. Hence, it serves mainly the donors geopolitical interests rather recipients 
potential. Therefore, Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) used this variable with caution, i.e., the 
military aid received by a recipient in any two of the last five years period. Further, it raises 
concerns about the reasons for flow of military aid.  
The military aid is usually given for some essential purpose, most likely to safeguard the 
donors’ security, and acts like responding to the geostrategic importance of a recipient. In fact, 
it is an effect, not a cause. Stein et al. (1985) explained three main purposes of the US 
military aid: (a) direct enhancement of US national security, (b) indirect enhancement of US 
national security, and (c) domestic problems. Firstly, the direct enhancement aims to raise the 
military power of US allies so they could control the security threats. Secondly, the indirect 
enhancement of US national security deals with aid given on the explicit or implicit demands 
of allies, and thirdly; the domestic economic and political interests, which keeps the defence 
production ‘warm’ and lowers the US military bill by reducing the average cost of production. 
Poe (1991a) determining the sources of US military aid during 1980s, developed the strategic 
importance index of recipients based on equal weight of five binary elements: non-
communist country bordering communist country, located in Western hemisphere, with more 
than 500 US military personnel, supplying ‘critical’ minerals to US, and faced an intense 
threat from leftist(s) before the aid decision. Again, this index seems more important in 
explaining the Cold War geopolitics especially the US strategic motives rather recipients 
potential. 
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Arms imports could be either on demand or on the need of recipients; or on the donors’ wish 
or interests, if a recipient is fighting or having perceived threats from the donor’s enemies. 
All these features ignore the recipients own military and nuclear capabilities, energy and 
mineral resources, and other key geographical features that might be relevant to determine the 
geopolitical potential. Similarly, the outward defence policy decisions of a recipient to join 
the donor’s defence alliance network, or providing the land or bases to donors’ troops, again 
ignore many other essential features. The political alignment with main donors at UNGA just 
captures one segment of geopolitical potential, i.e. foreign policy. Reynaud and Vauday 
(2009) have used a variety of features of geopolitical variables capturing the military, nuclear, 
energy and geographical elements to determine the strong correlated factors explaining the 
geopolitical factors, using the common factor analysis approach. They also used the UNGA 
voting record to determine the political alignment of recipients with main donor countries, for 
the concessional and non-concessional multilateral aid, disbursed by the IMF. Since we are 
just taking a small region of the World, therefore, we address the nuclear-geopolitics 
separately due to its prime importance, and construct geopolitical-potential index based on 
common features of South Asian economies. 
Recently, Teclean (2010) has made an effort to determine the power-states, pivotal-states and 
peripheral-states based upon their geopolitical potential ranging from 0 to 100. He measured 
the geopolitical potential by considering six main elements: geostrategic position (number of 
seas, borders, and strategic routes), size of the territory, demographic potential (population 
and its growth rate), an economic potential (GDP), organizational capacity (political 
stability), and military budget. He assigned 20 percentage weightage to geostrategic position, 
demographic and economic potential, 15 per cent to organizational capacity and military 
budget, and 10 per cent to size of territory based upon his own intuition. The countries having 
geopolitical potential score above 40 are considered as power-states (US, China and Russia 
only), and those ranging from 20 to 40 are pivotal states while below 20 are peripheral states. 
Our study considers the potential variables of Teclean (2010), Reynaud and Vauday (2009), 
Poe (1991a), and other key variables from the relevant literature to determine the geopolitical 
potential systematically. However, some of the fundamental features as highlighted by the 
Teclean (2010), i.e., political stability, population, economic potential, etc., have been taken 
separately in models to determine their individual effects, based upon their respective 
significance in literature. Secondly, assigning the weights in empirical settings is important 
which should not simply be based on intuition. Thirdly, this study is targeting the recipients 
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from the developing region rather looking at all countries including the developed donor 
nations. 
The theoretical framework shows a variety of factors explaining geopolitical potential. Hence, 
to filter out the important variables jointly explaining the geopolitical potential, this study 
applies the same approach of Reynaud and Vauday (2009). We incorporate a wider range of 
variables determining the geostrategic importance (based upon internal strengthening factors, 
covering the mineral and energy resources, infrastructure, military capabilities, and 
geographical features), and joins it with outward defence policy, political globalization and 
UN voting of countries, using a factor analysis.  
Factor analysis, also known as ‘spectral decomposition’, is a method to reduce the number of 
data, that is, the original matrix to a smaller subset of data, capturing most of the information 
based upon eigen values of the covariance matrix. Mathematically, following the Reynaud 
and Vauday (2009), the factor analysis with observation (xi) states that: 
          𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−1 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑝𝑝)          (1) 
 
where fr is the common r-th vector, k is specified, and ei is a residual that exhibits the 
variation sources affecting xi. The general factor will be explaining the correlation matrix, 
based upon the sets of correlations of the observed variables. The product of any two of these 
correlations will be equivalent to the correlation between the two observed variables. We 
apply the ‘regression’ method to derive the factor scores for this geo-strategic potential factor 
(gsf). The later form is here under: 
       gp = Ʌ(Ʌ. Ʌ' + Ʃu)-1 X'   =   (I + Ʌ' Ʃu-1/2 Ʌ)-1 Ʌ'. X'                   (2) 
where Ʌ represents factor matrix, Ξ = F. Ʌ' gives Ʌ', the left side shows the ‘true’ regressor 
values in a matrix. The equation X = Ξ + U, gives the matrix for observations X, where U 
embodies the error matrix, like for ei in equation (1). The product Ʌ. Ʌ' denotes the cross-
factor matrix of Ʌ with each other. The equation Ʃu = diag(σ2u1, σ2u2,…, σ2up) determines the 
covariance matrix of the unique factors. 
The choice for the number of variables is not limited like regression, i.e., the greater the 
number of variables, the greater will be the common underlying factors, explaining the 
 
 
26 
 
maximum share of the variance. The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) can be used to select the number of common underlying factors 
along with maximum likelihood tests. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy, which compares the magnitude of the observed correlation coefficients to the 
magnitude of partial correlation coefficients, is used to measure the commonalities for factor 
analysis. The strongly correlated factors jointly better explaining the geopolitical potential 
essentially is based upon common features of the South Asian countries. There are couple of 
geopolitical features that shows the unique characteristics of South Asian economies like civil 
nuclear capabilities, oil and gas pipelines, critical natural resources (uranium, copper, iron, 
gold, etc.). Nevertheless, we do not take such unique characteristics into account in factor 
analysis since our focus is more on uniform features, playing its composite role in affecting 
aid decisions in South Asia. 
The literature on geopolitics features population, economic condition (in terms of income) as 
well as the nuclear defence capabilities as the significant factors to determine the geopolitical 
potential. However, the work on aid allocation also highlights the essential roles of these 
factors, and suggests biases that aid per capita is being overlooked by donors.16 Therefore, we 
incorporate these factors in aid allocation equation separately. One important reason to take 
them separately is that we could differentiate the interests of donors from the recipients’ 
needs depending upon the economic conditions of the recipients. Likewise, greater 
population is also considered distinctively because some anomalies have been found in the 
literature with respect to population size. 
The following table provides the list of variables used to measure geopolitical potential: 
Table 2: Variables measuring the Geopolitical Potential (with Unit and Sources) 
Variables Unit Sources 
Total Petroleum & Other Liquid 
Production billion barrels/ day 
                                       
US EIA/ UK Min. Stats 
Coal Production 1000 ST UK Mineral Statistics 
Electricity Gross Production kilowatt hours, million US EIA, UN Energy Stats 
Railroads length km CIA World Factbook, 
                                                 
16 Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; McGillivray, 1989; Trumbull and Wall, 1994 
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WDI 
Roadways length km CIA World Factbook 
Area km2 
CIA World Factbook, 
WDI 
Number of borders Unit CIA World Factbook 
Length of coastlines km CIA World Factbook 
Number of Airports number CIA World Factbook 
Number of Seaports number CIA World Factbook 
Military Expenditures % of GDP WDI, SIPRI 
Armed Forces Total Number  WDI 
US Troops (stationed) 
Number of US military 
troops present 
Heritage Foundation, 
Vetfriends 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) dummy (1: signatory, 0: otherwise) IAEA  
UN Peace Missions (Forces Contribution) 
Average number of soldiers 
per year 
UN Peace Keeping Stats 
Political Globalization Index (1-100) 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
UN General Assembly Important Voting  (% votes matches with US) 
US State Deptt. Reports on 
UN Voting Practices 
UN General Assembly Overall Voting (% votes matches with US) 
US State Deptt. Reports on 
UN Voting Practices 
UN Security Council Membership dummy (1: Member, 0: otherwise) UNSC Membership stats 
 
Some of the variables (in Table 2) have been used by Reynaud and Vauday (2009) but our 
study incorporates more variables found present in most of South Asian countries and 
exclude those which appear unique (or absent in most of the countries like oil and gas 
reserves, pipelines, civil nuclear technology, uranium, copper, iron and gold reserves, etc.) to 
develop a measure a geopolitical potential on similar grounds. We also use some features of 
Poe’s (1991a) strategic importance index after carefully modifying with respect to the post-
Cold war scenario.  
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Once the important factors explaining geopolitical potential are derived from principal 
component analysis, we can use the derived factors to develop a measure of geopolitical 
potential based upon three different methods as explained by a literature.  
Firstly, factor score coefficients or component scores on each explained factor are estimated 
using regression method. Then, we develop a Non-Standardized Index (NSI) based upon the 
proportion of explanation of each particular factor in overall explained variance by all factors 
after rotation. The rotation with a varimax approach is applied to reduce the size of sub-
indicators with high loading on same factor. The purpose of this change or rotation in 
factorial axes is to determine simpler structure of the factors (Nardo et al., 2005). The non-
standardized index has both positive and negative values but can be standardized by 
following method as suggested by Krishnan (2010). The similar approach has been used in 
earlier studies (Sekhar et al., 1991; Anotny & Rao, 2007). 
 
Standardized Geopolitical Potential Index = (NSI value of each case – Minimum NSI) x 100 
                                                                         (Maximum NSI – Minimum NSI) 
 
The second approach is to develop an index initially based upon the weights from post 
rotation factor loadings matrix as suggested by Nardo et al. (2005). Firstly, we assign weight 
to each variable of the factor by squaring its factor loadings or score divided by its total factor 
loadings after rotation. Then we combine the normalized factor loadings of all variables in 
each factor to develop composites. Then these derived factors (or composites) are assigned 
weights according to their proportion in explained variance in dataset. 
 
Thirdly, once the results are derived from factor analysis, we use the original variables 
forming factors and aggregate them to form composites by assigning equal weights. Then 
each composite is assigned weight equal to the proportion of its explained variance after 
rotation as suggested by Pomeroy et al., (1997) and Abeyasekara (2005). 
We use all three methodologies to construct an index of geopolitical potential: Standardized 
geopolitical potential, weighted factor loading method, and factor weighted original data 
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method as discussed earlier to strengthen our analysis. Further, their logistic forms will be 
taken to measure the change in empirical analysis. The variables used in further estimation of 
models related to bilateral economic aid both from DAC and Non-DAC donors as well as 
from multilateral sources are given below in table 3 with units and sources: 
 
Table 3: Variables Description (unit and sources)-Aid Models 
 
 
# Variables Unit Source
1 Current Account Balance % of GDP IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
2 Current Account Dummy Dummy (1 for positive balance, 0 otherwise) Derived from IMF GFS
3 Democracy (institutionalized) Scale: 0 to 10 (0 autocracy, 10 strong democratic) Polity IV dataset
4 GDP growth percentage World Development Indicators (WDI)
5 HCTB Deaths numbers Center for Systemic Peace
6 HCTB Incidents per year numbers Center for Systemic Peace
7 HF Corruption Freedom from Corruption Scale: 0 to 100 (0 most corrupt) The Heritage Foundation
8 DAC Aid Million US$ OECD Statistics
9 GNP per capita Current US$ World Development Indicators (WDI)
10 Geopolitical Potential Index (derived from principal component analysis) Constructed using PCA
11 NON DAC AID Million US$ OECD Statistics
12 SHARE OF DONORS Donors share  in Recipient's Imports (percentage) IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
13 Openness Trade (% of GDP) World Development Indicators (WDI)
14 Non DAC Aid Million US$ OECD Statistics
15 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile numbers Kristensen & Norris (2013)
16 Nuclear Warheads Dummy (1 for Nuclear Defence Capabilities, 0 otherwise) Information derived from SIPRI
17 Polity2 Scale: -10 (strong autocratic) to +10 (strong democratic) Polity IV dataset
18 Population numbers World Development Indicators (WDI)
19 US Ally Dummy (1 for allies, 0 otherwise) The Heritage Foundation
20 US Military Aid Constant US$ 2012 US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook)
21 WT Dummy (1 for War on Terror period, 0 otherwise) US State Department
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 Does the military assistance respond to geopolitical potential? Is there any relationship 
between military and economic aid? 
This study hypothesizes that military assistance induces economic aid. As Poe (1991a) 
determined that military aid responds to the strategic importance of countries based on key 
variables, therefore, we assume that the geopolitical potential may attract military assistance 
at first which may further trigger economic aid especially from the DAC donors. 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Poe (1991a), Poe and Meernik (1995) have also used 
other key variables like human rights abuse, ideology and communist bordering to determine 
their role in military aid disbursement. Since, we are more interested in the inter-War and 
War-on-Terror time periods rather than the Cold War, the communist ideology, which 
remained significant during the Cold War, lost its importance in the post-Cold War 
environment. Correspondingly, the communist bordering variable has not been considered for 
this study.  
In the military assistance model, we also account nuclear capabilities, political stability, and 
democracy along with geopolitical potential to determine their effect on the disbursement of 
the US military assistance. Further, to study the donors’ geopolitical interests separately, we 
develop a dummy variable of the US alliance.  
LOG (Mil_Aid)it = α0 + α1LOG(GP)it + α2D1(US_Ally)it + 
α3Nuclear_Weapons_Stockpilesit  
                        + α4Democit + α5Political_Stability +  α6D2(WT)t +  eit              (3) 
In equation 3, the US military aid has been taken as the dependent variable. We apply pooled 
OLS and fixed effect estimation techniques. The pooled OLS models do not allow 
heterogeneity. They also assume the constant coefficients across time and cross-sections. 
Therefore, we apply fixed effect technique too for heterogeneity purpose. The fixed effect 
models provide time-in-variant intercepts for each individual (country) that is not possible in 
pooled OLS models. We also expect the geopolitical potential of recipients to be non-linear 
with military aid since military aid can reduce after a recipient reaches self-sufficient or 
(desired) greater level of military power in OLS estimations. We will also be adding few 
other interactive variables to strengthen our analysis with respect to War on Terror, as shown 
below in equation (3.1). 
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LOG(Mil_Aid)it = α0 + α1LOG(GP)it +  α2LOG(GP)2it+ α3D1(US_Ally)it + 
α4Nuclear_Weapons_Stockpilesit + α5Democit + α6Political_Stability + α7D2(WT)t +  
α8LOG(GP)it * D2(WT)t +  α9LOG(GP)it * Nuclear_Weapons_Stockpilesit +  eit               (3.1) 
Since some countries have not been given military aid in some time period, this study takes 
advantage of applications of the limited dependent variable models. The literature on aid 
highlights two steps of aid disbursement: gate-keeping and stage-setting. The gate keeping 
refers to the selection of countries and stage-setting describes the aid allocation. This 
approach has been used in form of Probit and later OLS, Heckman’s two-part models, and 
Tobit one-step procedure. Therefore, this study takes Tobit (one-step) into account for impact 
on selection and allocation of US military aid simultaneously. A linear latent function of 
equation (3) is given by: 
      yit* = max(0, βXit + uit)                                                                                                      (4) 
     with   uit – N (0, σ2) 
    and    yit = yit*           if yit* > 0 
             yit  = 0             otherwise 
where yit* denotes the latent potential amount of military aid to recipients i over time t,  Xi 
shows the vector of explanatory variables like geopolitical potential, the US alliance, nuclear 
stocks, and others (as mentioned in equation 3), β represents the vector of associated 
parameters, ui is an error term which is assumed to be independent of Xi and iid across 
individuals. 
An important feature of Tobit estimations is that it can be classified as a combination of both 
OLS and probability models. Therefore, applying Tobit will have joint features in explaining 
OLS and probability effects. The coefficients should be read with caution as they contain 
both features. Firstly, the obtained coefficients will not be observed for marginal impact on 
the regressand (dependent variable), i.e., a unit change in a regressor (independent variable) 
will affect the mean value of a regressand. Secondly, it would also be affecting the 
probability of the regressand. The probability also depends upon the range of variables in the 
model and their corresponding coefficients. However, their effect on mean value of 
regressand will be smaller because it is later interacted with a probability that ranges between 
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0 and 1. For a simple analysis, we can observe its initial effect on the mean value of 
regressand. However, for a simple analysis, one can directly interpret the slope coefficient as 
the marginal impact on the mean value of latent variable (yit*), instead of observed 
regressand.  
Further, we explore a relationship between military aid and economic aid disbursed by DAC 
members. Since we are considering US military assistance, therefore, we design to explore its 
relationship with bilateral aid only from DAC donors rather non-DAC.  We also take 
advantage of the vector autoregressive (VAR) estimations followed by Granger Causality test. 
At first, this study checks the stationarity status of the two series, if they are found stationary 
then we can simply apply VAR approach. Alternatively, the panel cointegration technique 
can be applied to investigate the relationship. The following equation shows the direction of 
military aid causing the total bilateral economic aid from DAC donors only to South Asian 
recipients using Granger-causality approach. 
DACAIDit = β0 + β1DACAIDi,t-1 +….+ βpDACIDi,t-p + α1MILAIDi,t-1+…..+ αpMILAIDi,t-p 
+ ɛit                                                                                                                                               
(5) 
We test the null hypothesis that coefficients of lagged military aid (αs) in equation 3 are 
jointly equal to zero. Using the F-test, if we reject this null hypothesis then we can say that 
the military aid Granger causes total bilateral economic aid. The opposite direction is being 
checked by the following equation: 
MILAIDit = β0 + β1MILAIDi,t-1+…..+ βpMILAIDi,t-p + α 1DACAIDi,t-1 +….+ 
αpTDACAIDi,t-p + ɛit                                                                                                                                           
(6) 
The coefficients of lagged economic aid (αs) in equation 4 are checked for zero equivalence 
jointly for null hypothesis. The significance or insignificance of F-test for both equations 5 
and 6 can help us to conclude about the direction. 
Now, we move on to our first main hypothesis. 
What is the role of geopolitical potential in aid disbursement to South Asian economies 
both for bilateral and multilateral bodies with respect to the post-Cold War period? 
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3.4 Empirical Models 
The earlier studies on strategic aspects of aid allocation used separate models both for the 
donor interests and recipient needs (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984). The later generation started 
using hybrid models to avoid the selection bias problems (McGillivray, 2003; Berthelemy, 
2006). The aid-allocation models were strengthened by Cingranelli and Pasqurello (1985), 
when they designed the aid allocation in two-stage process, i.e., gate-keeping and stage-
setting. The gate-keeping refers to ‘aid-selection’, i.e., which countries to be given aid, while 
stage-setting refers to ‘aid-allocation’, i.e., how much aid to be given to each recipient. This 
approach has been used in many studies of aid allocation (Meernik et al., 1998; Neumayer, 
2003; Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Balla and Reinhardt, 2008; Clist, 2011; Dreher et al., 2011). 
Since this study concentrates on a small region, comprising over few countries, therefore, 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) is being applied as economic aid has been given to the 
most of the South Asian countries without any break. The absence of zero economic aid 
indicates to avoid the conventional two-stage process of aid selection and allocation. A 
number of panel studies applying the two-stage process, have used the Heckman’s two part 
model, Probit and later OLS, and one-step Tobit methods (McGillivray, 2003; Neumayer, 
2003; Berthelemy and Ticht, 2004; Berthelemy, 2006; Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; 
Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Balla and Reinhardt, 2008; Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Clist, 2011; 
Dreher et al., 2011).  
Earlier studies generally studied the overall aid disbursed by all sources. But the recent 
studies have witnessed distinguishing behaviour of different groups of donors and varying 
significance of the variables. Therefore, we design our study by observing the behaviour of 
different donors like Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Non-DAC donors for bilateral aid, 
and multilateral agencies separately. 
Terrorism has not been accounted in most of earlier studies. We are using domestic terrorism 
in our applied models in form of high casualty terrorists’ bombings. This variable helps us to 
observe the behaviour of donors towards domestic bombings and terrorists attacks before and 
during the War on Terror. Since the study period involves the War on Terror, it would be 
interesting to consider whether the domestic terrorism in South Asian countries influences the 
 
 
34 
 
total aid or is it just the War on Terror that influences aid due to perceived threats of terrorism 
to the main donors, without considering the local features of terrorism.                                                                    
3.4.1 Bilateral Aid from DAC donors 
The pooled OLS method is applied after checking the stationary status of our concerned 
variables (see Appendix on page 112). In case of non-stationarity, relevant techniques like 
error correction methods can be applied. Since most of our variables are found stationary, 
therefore, we can apply the pooled ordinary least squares method initially to determine the 
bilateral economic aid from DAC donors. The pooled ordinary least squares is based upon 
commonalities among cross-sections, and do not allow heterogeneity in estimation 
mechanism. All the individuals (countries) share common intercept. 
Further, we also use the fixed effect techniques to consider the heterogeneity in our cross-
sections. This method carrying heterogeneity features, allows us to have a separate intercept 
for each country. The heterogeneous features (subject specific) are subsumed in intercepts 
(Gujrati, 2009). In panel data, fixed effect estimations take full account of the features (like 
geography, country size, natural endowments) that are ‘time-invariant’ (Asteriou and Hall, 
2011). Hence, both the techniques have been applied for bilateral aid disbursed by DAC 
donors. 
The hybrid model contains both the elements of recipient needs and interests of DAC donors 
in the following equation: 
DAC Economic Aid = f (income (per capita), economic growth, imports from donors, trade 
openness, population, democracy, corruption, political stability, current account balance 
dummy, geopolitical potential,  terrorism (domestic), multilateral aid, War on Terror dummy, 
bilateral aid from non-DAC sources)             
It would be interesting to determine whether bilateral aid from DAC depends positively or 
negatively upon the non-DAC aid and vice versa. The econometric equation would be: 
LOG(DAID)it = β0 + β1LOG(GNP)it + β2LOG(Growth)it + β3LOG(IMPD)it + 
β4LOG(Open)it + β5Popit + β6Demoit + β7Corrupit + β8POLit + β9D3(CAB)it + 
β10LOG(GP)it + β11Terrorit + β12LOG(MAID)it+ β13D2(WT)t + β14NDAIDit + ɛit                                                                                    
(7) 
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Here, we again expect the geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients to be quadratic in 
relationship with bilateral aid disbursed by DAC donors in OLS estimation method (see 
equation 7.1). If aid is influenced by geopolitical potential, then DAC donors, pushed by their 
electoral system and (propagated) development agenda of aid disbursement program, would 
tend to reduce aid to recipients making greater progress to raise their geopolitical potential. In 
Fixed Effects estimation method, we expect it to be linear since we assume all heterogeneous 
(time-invariant) characteristics of recipients subsumed in intercept. Since, the geopolitical 
potential is based on combination of time variant and invariant features, it could also be 
negative due to greater value of India in the region relative to other countries, which can raise 
the mean value in panel dataset. It is expected that the (time-variant) population will be non-
linear (or quadratic) in relationship with DAC aid in fixed effects estimations. We also 
determine the geopolitical interests of DAC donors by incorporating a variable of the US 
alliance in equation (7) during the War on Terror period. Some of the main DAC donors are 
also in alliance with US under NATO, therefore, it is an important feature capturing the 
vested interests of donors if a recipient joins the main DAC donors in defence alliance during 
the War on Terror. We incorporate a substantial range of interactive variables in our models 
to further strengthen our analysis of aid disbursement with respect to War on Terror, as show 
below in equation (7.1). 
LOG(DAID)it = β0 + β1LOG(GNP)it + β2LOG(Growth)it + β3LOG(IMPD)it + 
β4LOG(Open)it + β5Popit + β6Demoit + β7Corrupit + β8POLit + β9D3(CAB)it + 
β10LOG(GP)it + β11LOG(GP)2it + β12Terror it + β13LOG(MAID)it+ β14D2(WT)t + 
β15NDAIDit + β16LOG(GP)it * D1(US_Ally)it* D2(WT)t * D4(Nuclear_Warheads)it  + β17 
D1(US_Ally)it* D2(WT)t * D4(Nuclear_Warheads)it + β18 Terrorit * D2(WT)t +  ɛit                                                                                                                                             
(7.1) 
Further, status of nuclear states and their production capabilities is designed to be determined 
in the DAC economic aid models since nuclear capabilities are considered as an important 
source of geopolitical potential but we intend to study their effect separately. Both India and 
Pakistan have nuclear weapons and their scale of production is growing over time, therefore, 
it is quite interesting to study this effect in aid disbursement. We use a range of variables and 
their interactive forms to well-understand their relationship with aid. Their individual and 
interactive significances and the differences are also analysed in testing multiples equations 
for each model. 
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3.4.2 Bilateral Aid from Non-DAC donors 
For non-DAC aid models, we apply the pooled OLS models initially based upon their 
stationarity status. Further, we estimate the fixed effect models to determine the non-DAC aid, 
allowing heterogeneity in our cross-sections but time-in-variant. 
An important feature is found in data for the Non-DAC aid disbursed to South Asian 
countries. For some countries in some years, it has been observed negative. The negative sign 
indicates that fresh flows of aid disbursed by Non-DAC donors are lesser than the payments 
of existing loans provided by them. Therefore, along with OLS, we can move towards the 
combination of OLS and probability models, the Tobit estimations. In Tobit, we design to 
apply censored (normal) method which will be offsetting all negative values to zero and then 
use the censored data for estimations. Tobit procedure has been explained earlier in the 
military aid section of methodology. 
For the non-DAC aid to South Asian Countries, we apply the same mode like DAC aid with 
few changes. We replace the DAC aid as dependent to an independent, and non-DAC aid as 
dependent variable. Similarly, most of the South Asian countries have their imports mainly 
from DAC donors; therefore, we are not incorporating the share of non-DAC donors in the 
imports of South Asian countries due to their small size. 
Non-DAC Economic Aid = f (income (per capita), economic growth, trade openness, 
population, democracy, corruption, political stability, current account balance, geopolitical 
potential,  terrorism (domestic), multilateral aid, War on Terror dummy, bilateral aid from 
DAC sources, geopolitical potential of nuclear capable states during the War on Terror, 
terrorism in recipients during the War on Terror)                                                                      
The econometric equation would be: 
LOG(NDAID)it = β0 + β1LOG(GNP)it + β2LOG(Growth)it + β3LOG(Open)it + β4Popit + 
β5Demoit + β6Corrupit + β7POLit + β8D3(CAB)it + β9LOG(GP)it + β10Terrorit + 
β11LOG(MAID)it+ β12D2(WT)t + β13LOG(DAID)it + β14LOG(GP)it * D2(WT)t * 
D4(Nuclear_Warheads)it  + β14 Terrorit * D2(WT)t   +       ɛit                                                 (8) 
Like DAC aid model, we incorporate the nuclear capabilities of some of the South Asian 
countries due to its vital importance along with other interactive combinations of regressors. 
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A substantial range of variables is taken to analyse their individual and interactive 
significance of relationships to strengthen our analysis of aid disbursement of non-DAC 
donors with respect to War on Terror. 
3.4.3 Multilateral Aid 
  Similarly, pooled ordinary least square method is being applied initially to determine the 
behaviour of multilateral aid with respect to geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients. 
Later, we also use the fixed effect estimation approach by allowing heterogeneity in our 
cross-sections. 
The multilateral aid from all sources to the South Asian economies are determined with same 
variables except imports from donors, while aid from both DAC and non-DAC bilateral 
sources are introduced as explanatory variables in the following equation (10). 
Multilateral Aid (per capita) = f (income (per capita), economic growth, trade openness, 
population, democracy, corruption, political stability, current account balance, geopolitical 
potential,  terrorism (domestic), War on Terror dummy, bilateral aid from DAC sources, 
bilateral aid from Non-DAC donors, geopolitical potential of nuclear capable states during 
the War on Terror, terrorism in recipients during the War on Terror, terrorism in US ally 
during the War on Terror).                                                                                                                        
The econometric equation would be: 
 
LOG(MAID)it = β0 + β1LOG(GNP)it + β2LOG(Growth)it + β3LOG(Open)it + β4Popit + 
β5Demoit + β6Corrupit + β7POLit + β8D3(CAB)it + β9LOG(GP)it + β10Terrorit + 
β11D2(WT)t+ β12LOG(DAID)it + β13LOG(GP)it * Nuclear_Weapons_Stockpilesit * 
D2(WT)t + β14Terrorit * D2(WT)t +    β14 D1(US_Ally)it  * Terrorit * D2(WT)t      ɛit                                                    
(9) 
Additionally, different models are developed by incorporating a diverse range and forms of 
variables to strengthen our analysis of multilateral aid during the War on Terror. To check the 
robustness, the diagnostic tests for residuals’ normality, heterogeneity, autocorrelation and 
other key assumptions of classical linear regression are also estimated to validate our findings 
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both on unbiased and efficiency foundations. The results of these diagnostic tests are given in 
Appendix section. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
4.1 A Factor Analysis: Measurement and Construction of Geopolitical 
Potential Index 
Following Reynaud and Vauday (2009), we extended the range of variables for factor 
analysis based on common explanatory variables found in most cases (at least four) in five 
South Asian countries. Since, our focus is mainly on common explanatory power of all the 
variables determining geopolitical potential, therefore, we could not use unique factors that 
were found absent in most out of five countries. Some of the South Asian economies have 
some unique features explaining geopolitical potential like production of some critical 
elements, i.e., gold (India only), uranium, copper, etc., are found only in India and Pakistan, 
and channelizing the natural resources (mainly oil and gas) through pipelines. Similarly, 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are only produced by India and Pakistan but the nuclear 
potential is much important, therefore, we introduced the nuclear potential in our final models 
based upon their unique nature rather to derive factors through Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), focusing the common features. Using the Principal Component Analysis as the 
extraction method with Varimax rotation, we came across four main factors determining 
geopolitical potential. These four factors jointly explain 88.25 percent variance (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: Total Variance Explained (Principal Component Analysis)
 
The first factor consists of potential of land with respect to natural resources, geographical 
features, infrastructure, and armed forces, explains most of the variance around 55 percent. 
The second factor consists of military expenditures, presence of US troops, and nuclear non-
proliferation treaty (NPT) signatory, describes 16 percent variance while the third factor 
comprises of participation of a recipients’ troops in UN peace missions and political 
globalization, explains 11 percent variance. Forth factor which truly depicts the recipients’ 
participation in UN overall and important voting registers and membership of UN Security 
Council (UNSC), explicates more than 6 percent variance. The PCA results indicate that 
countries’ natural and man-made resources and military resources account much in 
explaining the geopolitical potential than political globalization and participation at UN. The 
weights were assigned to each factor according to their respective eigen values and loadings’ 
explanatory power of variance. 
Table 5: Rotated Component Matrix using PCA 
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Table6:  KMO and Bartlett's Test
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
also confirm the significance of the rotated component matrix derived from principal factor 
analysis. The following figure 7 shows the Scree plot which suggests the significance of first 
four factors in explaining the variance. 
Figure7: Scree Plot 
Rotated Component Matrixa
                               Component
1 2 3 4
Total Petroleum and Other Liquid Production (1000bbl/d) 0.988 0.105 0.082 -0.024
Roadways total (kms) 0.980 0.048 0.131 -0.021
Railroads (kms) 0.978 0.162 0.044 -0.038
Coal Production (1000 ST) 0.976 0.017 0.130 0.006
Length of Coastal line (kms) 0.967 0.153 0.018 -0.088
Area (sq km) 0.957 0.250 0.062 -0.031
Electricity Gross Production (kilowatt hours, million) 0.953 0.074 0.203 0.008
No. of airports 0.920 0.332 0.104 -0.021
Armed Forces, total 0.916 0.289 0.185 -0.075
No. of seaports 0.885 0.178 0.076 -0.076
Number of borders 0.780 0.446 0.193 0.091
Military Expenditure (% of GDP) -0.017 0.896 -0.130 -0.111
US troops 0.374 0.790 0.340 0.027
NPT -0.570 -0.771 -0.186 0.017
UN Peace Missions 0.086 0.053 0.912 0.075
UNGA Important Voting (%) -0.101 -0.057 -0.684 0.554
Political Globalization 0.492 0.512 0.575 -0.141
UNGA Voting overall (%) -0.114 -0.247 -0.180 0.765
UNSC Membership 0.084 0.355 0.278 0.516
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.8020
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. C 5600.7150
df 171.0000
Sig. 0.0000
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Later, we developed three different indices using different approaches derived from the 
literature and used them as independent variables in our models of military aid and economic 
aid from bilateral and multilateral sources. The detail is mentioned in methodological section 
to construct an index following different approaches to construct an index. All three different 
measures of geopolitical potential were found to have almost similar results with little bit 
variation in coefficient significance in few models.  
 
4.1 US Military Aid 
Many studies in the literature have used the US military assistance as a measure of 
geopolitical interests of donors. We also consider this measure of geopolitical interests of 
donors to determine its response to the geopolitical significance of recipients. We hypothesise 
that the donors’ geopolitical interests respond to the geopolitical significance of recipients. 
We developed different models using pooled OLS, fixed effect, and censored Tobit (normal) 
estimation techniques to determine the response of US military aid to geopolitical 
significance of South Asian recipients. As mentioned in methodology section, we will be 
using variety of variables, individually and in interactive forms, to well analyse their 
relationship with the US military aid. Therefore, multiple equations have been estimated to 
validate and strengthen the results. 
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4.1.1 Pooled OLS Estimations 
The estimations indicate the significantly positive role of geopolitical significance of 
recipients in influencing the US military aid. We find the quadratic relationship between the 
US military aid and geopolitical potential of recipients. Firstly, the US military aid increases 
as the geopolitical significance increases but diminishes eventually. The results show that the 
US military aid initially rises by 6.7 percent and eventually diminishes by 0.29 percent on 
average due to one percent rise in geopolitical potential ceteris paribus. This indicates that 
when the recipients’ natural and man-made resources starts improving and drive towards 
acquisition of conventional military capabilities along with the suitable outward defence 
policy and participation in UN voting in favour of recipients, the military aid from the US 
responds strongly positive. But later, when a country reaches towards sufficiency of natural 
and man-made resources, starts taking an advantage of geographical features and natural 
resources, raises military strength, and achieves some conventional modern military 
capabilities, the US military aid starts diminishing. Further, along with these developments, 
the improvement in infrastructural proportion of geopolitical potential induces less scope of 
aid after a certain level. As it carries a bunch of factors but their overall improvement either 
due to all or few, could be a reason for the reduction in flows of military aid. Conversely, the 
aid may start moving more towards development rather carrying influence of geopolitical 
significance. Of course, one cannot deny the strategic power play and alliances during the 
Cold War, i.e. the USSR-Indo and Pak-US defence relations. Similarly, the role of Afghan 
factor (the Russian invasion and later the War on Terror) also sounds important in 
determining the flows for the neighbouring or strategically important countries.  
Since, we are considering the post-Cold War period, therefore, only the WoT period and 
its alliance relevance seem important for our models than historical Cold-War defence 
relations. Therefore, this relationship between the US military aid and geopolitical 
significance of recipients explains post-Cold War scenario. We separately observed the US 
alliance and WoT period effects in our models to isolate the geopolitical significance from 
the coalition and war period effects. The results indicate that if a country is in alliance with 
US during the WoT, then the US military aid rises by 2.29 percent. The lag effect of the US 
alliance which indicates the previous track record of alliance has much stronger effect on the 
US military aid which significantly rises by 4.2 percent on average. 
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The War on Terror period effect also raises the flows of the US military aid. The pooled 
OLS models show that the military aid increases by 0.86 percent on average during the WoT 
compared to Inter-War period. Similarly, the geopolitical potential further carries 0.08 
percent US military aid during the WoT once it is interacted with the war period effect. The 
results also indicate the important role of nuclear weapon stockpiles. If a country’s nuclear 
weapons stock rises by 1 unit, then the US military aid positively changes by 0.02 percent. 
Table 7: US Military Aid - Pooled OLS Estimations 
           
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                       
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4.1.2 OLS Fixed Effect Models 
The fixed effect models also indicate a linear positive relation between the geopolitical 
potential and the US military aid. But here, the relationship is comparatively weaker than the 
pooled OLS models. The lag effect is found stronger for the role of geopolitical potential in 
influencing the US military aid. The results indicate that one percent rise in geopolitical 
potential in last year raises the military aid from the US in current time period by 2.15 percent 
on average ceteris paribus. 
The recent previous track of a recipients’ alliance with US also carries important role in 
determining the flows of military aid. The results depict that if a country remained a US ally 
in previous time period, then it raises military aid in current time period by 5 percent on 
average. The period effect of WOT is found relatively weaker than the pooled OLS models. 
The results indicate that the US military aid rises by 0.53 percent on average during the WoT 
than inter-war period. 
Table 8: US Military Aid- OLS Fixed Effects Estimations   
     
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                        
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Comparison of Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Models: 
Both the pooled OLS and fixed effect models show the unbiased results. The comparison 
of both the estimation techniques on basis of F-statistics, the pooled OLS models are 
relatively much higher than the fixed effect. Therefore, we prefer pooled OLS models results. 
4.1.3 Censored Tobit (Normal) Estimations 
Alternatively, we also applied the censored Tobit (normal) estimation approach since the 
US military aid is found zero absent or zero in few years for some countries. The Tobit model 
will only consider the positive value under normal situation rather truncated to develop a 
relationship between the US military and independent variables. The Tobit estimations again 
develop a polynomial relationship between the geopolitical potential of South Asian 
recipients and the US military aid. The results indicate that one percent rise in geopolitical 
potential initially brings 5.97 percent rise in the desired US military aid and eventually 
diminishes marginally by 0.26 percent on average (ceteris paribus) due to the same reasons 
as explained earlier.  
The US alliance in a recent time period also plays a significantly positive role in 
influencing the US military aid in current time. The results illustrates that if a country 
remained a US ally in last time period, then it raises the desired military aid from US by 4.21 
percent on average compared to countries not in alliance with US. 
Similarly, the period effect has been found stronger in explaining the disbursement of the 
US military aid. The results explain that the desired US military aid rises by 0.87 percent on 
average during the WoT than the inter-War period.  
The geopolitical potential also carries some strength due to WoT period effect. When the 
geopolitical potential interacts with WoT period, we find that it further raises desired military 
aid from US by 0.08 percent.  
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Table 9: US Military Aid Models- Censored Tobit (normal) Estimations
       
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                        
4.2 Bilateral DAC Economic Aid: 
We applied both pooled OLS and fixed effect estimation techniques to determine the results 
based on commonalities and heterogeneity respectively. We estimated multiple equations 
using both techniques by incorporating range of variables, individually and interactive forms, 
to further validate the results, and strengthen the analysis. 
4.2.1 Pooled OLS Estimations 
     The pooled ordinary least squares estimations in Table 10 show that geopolitical potential, 
share of donors in recipients’ imports, alliance with the US in War of Terror, population size, 
flows from non-DAC donors and multilateral sources, and domestic terrorism are 
substantially significant in influencing the flows of aid from Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) members while the per capita income, (negative) current account balance, 
democracy, political stability, trade openness, (freedom from) corruption, accession of 
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nuclear weapons, and War on Terror period have not been found significant. The economic 
growth has been found playing some partial role in influencing aid from DAC donors. 
Interestingly, the geopolitical potential of recipients has been found most important in 
influencing the supply of foreign aid to South Asian economies (see Table 10). We will be 
discussing each variable in detail here under: 
The Geopolitical potential index, combination of different factors derived from factors 
analysis mainly the geostrategic features, outward defence policy, diplomatic relations, and 
role and participation in the United Nations, mainly affects the supplies of foreign aid. Earlier 
studies have mainly focused on geopolitical interests of donors but very few have attempted 
to determine the geopolitical potential of recipients. We have tried to determine geopolitical 
potential of recipients too. The construction of geopolitical potential index has been discussed 
in detail earlier in methodology section. 
Interestingly, we came across with a different pattern of geopolitical potential of 
recipients with respect to its influence on aid than earlier studies either reporting geopolitical 
interests of donors or geopolitical significance of recipients. We found that the relationship 
between geopolitical potential of recipients and foreign aid from DAC donors is polynomial 
rather linear. Initially, as the geopolitical potential changes, it brings large flows of foreign 
aid from DAC donors, but gradually it starts diminishing but with less magnitude. The results 
depict that one percent rise in geopolitical potential brings initially on average around 8 
percent rise in DAC economic aid, and later diminishes by 0.35 percent. The flows of foreign 
aid from DAC donors do not fall as much as they positively behave during the increasing 
returns phase. This relationship suggests that once the economy reaches to a certain larger 
value on scale of geopolitical potential, it marginally loses its attraction for flows of aid from 
DAC donors. For example, if a country becomes geopolitically much significant and become 
a power in the region in terms of its geostrategic features, defence policy, and on diplomatic 
fronts, or may get influential in making decisions about the region by gaining such strengths 
then aid may start declining towards giants of the region.  
A cross-sectional view of geopolitical potential will further clear this relationship. If a 
country raises its military strength (both in terms of capabilities attained through expenditures 
or in its size) or/ and attracts US military aid then it further raises geopolitical potential due to 
gained strength in military capabilities, a component of geopolitical potential. The effect of 
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geopolitical potential on average is much higher in case of bilateral economic aid than the US 
military aid. Similarly, if a country produces more of natural resources essential for energy 
like coal and oil; invests more in strategic infrastructure in building more network of 
highways, railroads, air and sea-ports; and aligns itself on diplomatic fronts with US both on 
bilateral and United Nations forums, then these all features take the economy towards the 
sufficiency rather much dependence on foreign flows. Conversely, the positive growth of 
geopolitical potential with either low levels or in absence of few components of index keeps 
the economy in phase of receiving further higher flows of aid from DAC donors.  
Considering multiple models of ordinary least squares, the results show that one percent rise 
in geopolitical potential can bring 8 percent more flows of aid from DAC donors on average 
ceteris paribus. The geopolitical potential during the war on terror period has not been 
observed significant which indicates that aid could have been given mainly due to 
geopolitical interests of donors rather recipients potential. 
The share of main five DAC donors (US, UK, Japan, Germany and France) in imports of 
South Asian countries shows significantly negative relationship. Studies done on economic 
interests of donors have mainly reported positive relationship between aid disbursed and 
share of donors in recipients’ imports. The results show that one percentage increment in 
joint share of five donors in recipients’ imports can reduce DAC aid by 0.20 percentage 
points on average.  
The US alliance is also an important variable that positively contribute in flows of DAC 
aid. The results significantly show that if a country becomes a US ally, then it is likely to a 
have 0.70 percent more aid than a country not in alliance with US in War against terrorism. 
Interestingly, geopolitical potential during the War on Terror period has not been found 
significant. Even, this has not been found significant with having nuclear weapons but if a 
country is an ally with US in war against terrorism, the geopolitical potential coupled with 
nuclear weapons, will have positive impact on flows of aid from DAC donors. This means 
that both nuclear weapons or war on terror period have no significant impact on flows of 
DAC aid separately but US ally is an important factor which make them significant because 
of its overwhelming role independently. 
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Population has been found significantly positive in determining flows of aid. The results 
show that if a population increases by 1 million, the flows of DAC aid rises by around 0.003 
percent on average. The population has been found significant in many of the earlier studies. 
Indeed, it is an important factor. Some researchers include population in geopolitical potential 
as well but we excluded the role of population in developing geopolitical potential to observe 
this variable separately. The large size of population, if given education, can become an 
important source of exports of human capital. On other hand, it also increases the scope of 
poverty for a country with fewer resources.  
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                                                                 Table 10: DAC AID- Pooled OLS Estimations
       
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                       
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Multilateral aid from different sources like IMF, World Bank, etc., has also been found 
significantly positive in determining the flows of DAC aid to South Asian countries. If a 
country is given multilateral aid, there are more chances that it would get higher flows from 
DAC donors. The results display that on average a country receives 0.17 percent more aid if a 
multilateral aid rises by 1 percentage point. 
Similarly, the flows from non-DAC donors have also been found significantly positive. If 
a non-DAC aid rises by 1 million dollars in last time period, then the DAC aid rises by 
0.0025 percent on average in current time period. The outcome of non-DAC aid on flows of 
DAC aid has not been found much effective compared to multilateral flows. 
The domestic terrorism in terms of high casualties from terrorists’ bombings has been 
found significant in determining the flows of aid from DAC donors. The results depict that if 
one person dies from terrorists’ bombings leads to a 0.0008 percent rise in DAC aid on 
average. Alternatively, 100 percent dying in bombings raises the DAC Aid by 0.08 percent 
on average. This effect has been found stronger during the War on Terror (WT) in which it 
raises the DAC aid by 0.09 percent per 100 casualties from terrorists’ bombings.  
The economic growth has been observed partially significant in some models. The 
reciprocal relationship has been witnessed along with negative coefficient, which describes 
the positive nature of relationship between DAC aid and economic growth. If a rate of 
economic growth changes by 1 percentage point then on average the DAC aid rises between 
0.007 to 0.01 percent. Overall, this relationship is weaker compared to other significant 
variables discussed earlier. 
Further, OLS least square dummy variable method was also applied by introducing 
dummies for South Asian economies to determine their individual significance. Table 11 
shows the significant quadratic relationship between the geopolitical potential and bilateral 
economic aid from DAC sources. Per capita income, share of major donors in recipients 
imports, aid from non-DAC sources and multilateral agencies, and domestic terrorism were 
found important in determining aid flows. The dummies for regional economies were also 
observed significant in least square dummy variable models as shown below in Table 11. 
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Table 11: DAC Aid- OLS Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) Estimations 
         ***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                        
 
                                      DAC AID OLS Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
Dependent Variable: LDACAID
Independent Variables Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient
C
LGNPPC$ 0.350631** 0.34942** 0.38398**
POLITY2 -0.040642 -0.040017 -0.048703
LGPFAWTD 2.238284*** 2.260283*** 2.255057***
LGPFAWTD^2 -0.186946*** -0.189066*** -0.190762***
LTRADE 0.195157 0.196952 0.220087
LSHARE OF DONORS -0.354865** -0.353543** -0.343787**
1/LGDPGROWTH -0.005125 -0.005061 -0.004507
LMULTIAID 0.167642*** 0.166371*** 0.159136***
NONDACAID(-1) 0.001888*** 0.001885*** 0.001876***
CURRENT_ACCOUNT (D) 0.045725 0.064269 0.030755
POPULATION_TOTAL 1.96E-09 1.95E-09 1.26E-09
DEMOC 0.052035 0.051243 0.070158
HF_CORRUPTION 0.004542 0.004692 0.004726
HCTB_DEATHS(-1) 0.000704** 0.000701*** 0.00064***
WT
NUCLEAR_WARHEADS*LGPFAWTD*WT 0.010458
LGPFAWTD*WT 0.000834
DINDIA 4.648409** 4.733197** 5.403853***
DNEPAL -1.708055*** -1.725302*** -1.835375***
DPAK 2.006841** 2.036595** 2.019639**
DSL -1.544158*** -1.558645*** -1.723629***
Obs. 98 98 98
R-squared 0.8623 0.8623 0.8637
Adjusted R-squared 0.8352 0.8332 0.8347
F-Statistics 
Prob (F-Stats)
Durbin-Watson stats 1.2391 1.2358 1.1924
Jarque-Bera stats 5.1915 5.1540 4.8786
Prob (JB) 0.0746 0.0760 0.0872
Breusch-Pagan LM stats 13.2755 13.2948 12.1257
Prob (BP) 0.2087 0.2077 0.2767
LGNPPC$= Log GNP Per Capita; LGPFATWD= Log of Geopolitical Potential Index (factor loadings weighted method);
HCTB_DEATHS = Number of Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings; LMULTIAID = Log of Multilateral Aid;
LTRADE = Log Trade (% of GDP);  HF_CORRUPTION = Freedom from Corruption 
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4.2.2 OLS Fixed Effects Model 
We also applied fixed effects model to take into account the heterogeneity among five 
countries of South Asia. The results we obtained from fixed effects and pooled OLS models 
are more or less same except our main concerning variable, geopolitical potential index, and 
significance of few variables like trade openness and per capita income (see Table 12). 
The fixed effects models indicate the negative relationship between geopolitical potential 
and flows of DAC aid. The difference may be due to special features of each country such as 
population or size or value of geopolitical potential. Like, when we get the negative 
coefficient of geopolitical potential, only India has a negative intercept rest all countries of 
South Asia are found to have positive intercepts, which actually validates the heterogeneity 
due to large size of a country in the region. The geopolitical potential has not been found 
significant during the war on terror which indicates that donors’ geopolitical interests 
outweigh the recipients’ potential during the war on terror. 
The share of donors in imports of recipients again is found to have a negative 
relationship with flows of aid from DAC donors but weaker compared to pooled OLS results. 
The partially significant results indicate that one percentage rise in share of five main donors 
(US, UK, Japan, Germany and France) lead to a 0.35 percent fall in flows of DAC aid on 
average ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, the political stability is also found partially significant in few of models with a 
negative coefficient through reciprocal relationship, indicating a positive effect on flows of 
DAC aid.  
Trade openness is also observed partially significant in few models, indicating positive 
relationship through negative coefficient with reciprocal shape. On average of significant 
models, one percentage rise in trade to GDP ratio leads to 4.80 percentage rise in DAC aid. 
The per capita income has been observed strongly significant in fixed effects models, 
depicting a positive relationship. On average, one percentage rise in per capita income can 
raise DAC flows by 0.50 percent.  
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Population has also been observed significant. If population increases by 1 million then 
aid from DAC donors rises by 0.016 percent on average initially and later diminishes by a 
very minute magnitude as the curve has been observed polynomial. We also observed the 
linear relationship of population in few models as shown in table which explain that on 
average DAC aid rises by 0.002 percent if population rises by 1 million. 
Like pooled OLS estimations, we found same positive relationship of DAC aid with 
multilateral aid and non-DAC bilateral aid. If multilateral aid to South Asian economies rises 
by 1 percent, then DAC aid changes positively by 0.16 percent on average. Further, if aid 
from Non-DAC donors rises by 1 million dollars in last year, then DAC aid rises by 0.0018 
percent on average in current time period. The influence of multilateral aid on DAC aid has 
been found stronger than non-DAC aid. 
The presence of nuclear warheads has also been found quite significant in fixed effects 
models. If a country possesses nuclear warheads, then DAC aid responds rises by 6 percent 
on average as compared to a country without nuclear warheads. But when it is interacted with 
geopolitical potential index, it significantly behaves negatively and explains reduction in 
flows of DAC aid by 0.50 percent on average.  
Similarly, US ally is also found to be important variable significantly influencing flows 
of DAC aid. If a country is an ally of US during the war on terror, then DAC aid rises by 0.32 
percent. If a country is a US ally and possesses nuclear warheads, then DAC aid would rise 
by 0.62 percent on average.  
The domestic terrorism has also been observed significantly explaining DAC aid. If high 
casualty terrorists’ bombing rises by 1 more incident last year, then DAC flows will rise by 
0.026 percent in current time period. Similarly, if number of deaths from high casualty 
terrorists’ bombing rises by 100 last year, then DAC aid rises by 0.07 percent and during the 
War on Terror, it responds positively by 0.06 percent on average. This depicts that donors 
ideology regarding War on Terror also considers the terrorists attacks in recipient countries. 
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Table 12: DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations 
                      
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.                       
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                                             Table 12: DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations (continued)
      
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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                                               Table 12: DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations (continued)
 ***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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                                                   Table 12: DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations (continued)
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
OLS Fixed Effect Models
XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX
Dependent Variable: LDACAID
Independent Variables Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient Co-efficient
C 22.98357*** 22.62947*** 20.22589*** 17.69209*** 17.2123** 17.8471*** 17.59081**
LGNPPC$ 0.475081*** 0.516243*** 0.521937*** 0.433071*** 0.28266* 0.268629 0.278124
1/POLITY2 -0.293032 -0.368604 -0.15301 -0.256697 -0.167723 -0.167902 -0.157988
LGPFAWTD -1.786486*** -1.747172*** -1.46013** -1.193731** -1.214851** -1.244184** -1.247604**
1/LTRADE -0.505584 -1.739213 -4.977819** -4.569388* -1.02637 -1.08975 -1.021585
LSHAREOFDONORS -0.359399* -0.357317* -0.293776 -0.270916 -0.340064* -0.356637** -0.339318*
LGDPGROWTH -0.052036 -0.053485 -0.087511 -0.052999 -0.039948 -0.039959 -0.038801
LMULTIAID 0.145174** 0.152588** 0.153531** 0.150413*** 0.166385*** 0.146012** 0.164618***
NON_DAC_TOTAL_AID(-1) 0.00260*** 0.002813*** 0.002077*** 0.001263* 0.001251* 0.001535** 0.001256*
HF_CORRUPTION 0.007101 0.007183 0.005531 0.004719 0.005091 0.005459 0.005337
LGPFAWTD*WT*NUCLEAR_WARHEADS 0.016372*
LGPFAWTD*NUCLEAR_WARHEADS 0.000414 -0.492181*** -0.443952*** -0.575672*** -0.417842** -0.574036***
NUCLEAR_WARHEADS 6.13365*** 5.469089*** 6.943282*** 4.879703** 6.919101***
HCTB_DEATHS(-1)*WT 0.000661*** 0.000632*** 0.000473** 0.000628***
POPULATION_TOTAL 0.0000000028* 0.00000000262* 0.0000000028*
US_ALLY*WT 0.320958*
WT 0.014045
Obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
R-sqaured 0.8335 0.8272 3.8756 0.8619 0.8677 0.8729 0.8678
Adjusted R-sqaured 0.8054 0.7981 0.1441 0.8346 0.8396 0.8440 0.8376
F-Stats 29.6677 28.3752 29.6530 31.5730 30.8614 30.1335 28.7908
Prob (F-stats) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Durbin-Watson Stats 1.0050 1.0297 1.1123 1.1814 1.2879 1.2409 1.2842
Jarque-Bera Stats 1.7381 2.2786 3.8756 4.8698 4.1181 5.4963 4.0410
Prob. (JB) 0.4194 0.3201 0.1441 0.0877 0.1276 0.0641 0.1326
Breusch-Pagan Stats 12.5099 15.0561 12.8431 11.0221 8.1028 8.0886 7.9535
Prob. (BP) 0.2524 0.1300 0.2326 0.3558 0.6188 0.6202 0.6334
LGNPPC$= Log GNP Per Capita; LGPFATWD= Log of Geopolitical Potential Index (factor loadings weighted method); LTRADE = Log Trade (% of GDP), POLTY2 = Political Stability; 
HCTB_DEATHS = Number of Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings; LMULTIAID = Log of Multilateral Aid; HF_CORRUPTION = Freedom from Corruption 
 DEMOC = Democracy; WT = War on Terror.
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Comparison of Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Models: 
While comparing the pooled OLS and fixed effects models, we found pooled OLS more 
appropriate through comparative F-statistics which are far higher in OLS methods. Since, we 
are more interested in common results invariant across time and individuals, we prefer pooled 
ordinary least square estimation methods. 
4.2.3 Relation between the US Military Aid and the DAC Bilateral 
Economic Aid: 
Studies determining the geopolitical interests of donors mainly used the US military aid 
as a measure to detect its role in aid disbursement. But our study goes systematically by 
developing a hypothesis that the geopolitical interests of (DAC) donors measured by the US 
military aid actually responds to the geopolitical potential of countries. Further, we develop 
an insight by exploring the relationship between the economic aid disbursed by the DAC 
donors and geopolitical potential. We find that both the US military aid and economic aid 
from DAC donors have been significantly influenced by the geopolitical potential of South 
Asian recipients. The question then arises whether there is any relationship between the 
military aid and the economic aid from DAC donors? We correspond to this question by 
developing a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to determine the direction of influence of 
these two types of aid. The results indicate that both the US military aid and bilateral 
economic aid from DAC donors are significantly influenced by their first lags. The model 
also illustrates that the bilateral economic aid from DAC donors is significantly affected by 
the US military aid while the opposite is found insignificant. To validate influence of the US 
military aid on DAC aid, we further applied VAR Granger Casuality and Exogeneity Wald 
Tests, which confirm the relationship between them (see section III of Appendix). 
An important finding is drawn by comparing the effect of geopolitical potential on the 
US military aid and bilateral economic aid by DAC donors. The effect of geopolitical 
potential is found stronger in case of bilateral economic aid by DAC donors. One potential 
reason could be the robust effect of the US military assistance on further raising the military 
capabilities, which contributes in raising the geopolitical potential. Though we have not 
empirical tested it as it falls beyond the scope of this study but a systematic research on 
military capabilities and its dynamics with respect to geopolitical potential can be carried out 
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to further explore this effect which has not been seen in empirical literature on strategic role 
of aid. 
4.3 Bilateral Non-DAC Economic Aid 
We applied both pooled OLS and fixed effect estimation techniques to determine the 
results based on commonalities and heterogeneity respectively. Further, we also used 
censored Tobit (normal) estimation technique due to nature of this dependent variable, as 
explained in methodology section. We estimated multiple equations applying all techniques 
by incorporating range of variables, individually and interactive forms, to further validate the 
results, and strengthen the analysis. 
4.3.1 Pooled OLS Models 
The pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimations show that geopolitical potential, 
population, (negative) current account balance, multilateral aid (in previous time period), War 
on Terror (WoT) period, nuclear warheads and domestic terrorism in recipients potentially 
explain the non-DAC aid disbursed to South Asian economies while the corruption is found 
partially significant. Democracy, political stability, per capita income, trade openness, 
economic growth and DAC aid are found insignificant in explaining flows of non-DAC aid 
(see Table 13). 
The geopolitical potential index is found significantly explaining the non-DAC aid 
steadily. The coefficient depicts the positive relationship between non-DAC aid and 
geopolitical potential. On average, if the geopolitical potential increases by 1 percentage 
point, the non-DAC positively changes by 2 percent ceteris paribus. The coefficient is found 
to have a relatively stronger impact on aid disbursement by non-DAC countries. 
Population is again found to have a significantly negative relationship with non-DAC 
aid. The results show that if a population rises by one million, it reduces aid jointly from non-
DAC countries by 0.006 percent on average. 
The current account balance is also found significant in explaining the non-DAC aid.  
The coefficient shows a negative relationship. Since, the current account balance is a dummy 
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variable (1=positive balance, 0 otherwise), therefore, the negative balance raises the aid from 
non-DAC sources jointly by 1.3 percent on average. 
The multilateral aid also strongly explains the flows of non-DAC aid. There exists a 
positive relationship between flows of multilateral aid and non-DAC aid. The results show 
that one percent rise in multilateral aid in previous time period, raises the non-DAC aid 
jointly in current time period by 0.67 percent on average. 
The War on Terror (WoT) period is found significantly explaining the flows of non-DAC 
aid. There exists a negative relationship between the WoT and non-DAC Aid. The results 
show that during the WoT, the non-DAC aid significantly reduces by 14.98 percent. While 
this period effect when introduced with geopolitical potential, it raises the flows of non-DAC 
aid by 1.46 percent due to overwhelming role of geopolitical potential.  
Nuclear Warheads presence also explains the flows of non-DAC aid significantly 
negative. The results show that if a country possesses nuclear warheads, it reduces non-DAC 
aid by 2.95 percent on average. While the geopolitical potential when interacted with nuclear 
weapon stockpiles, the results show that on average it raises aid by just 0.002 percent due to a 
strong effect of geopolitical potential. The presence of nuclear weapons and the rise in its 
inventory overall explains the negative impact on aid. 
The domestic terrorism in terms of high casualty terrorists’ bombings positively explains 
the flows of non-DAC aid. The results show that one more death due to terrorists’ bombings 
raise the non-DAC flows by 0.002 percent. The same relationship exists during the WoT 
period with almost similar results. 
Corruption has been found relatively weaker in explaining flows of aid from non-DAC 
sources. There exists a negative relationship between freedom from corruption and non-DAC 
aid. The results show that one rank higher in freedom from corruption leads to a 0.04 percent 
fall in non-DAC aid on average. It indicates that flows of aid from non-DAC donors might be 
given to countries with poor scores in freedom from corruption. 
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                                                       Table 13: Non-DAC Aid - Pooled OLS Estimations
  
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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                                            Table 13: Non-DAC Aid - Pooled OLS Estimations (continued)
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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4.3.2 Fixed Effect Models 
The fixed effect estimations show the significance of per capita income, population, 
geopolitical potential, (negative) current account balance, trade openness, WoT period, 
nuclear warheads, DAC aid flows, and domestic terrorism during the War on Terror. While 
the economic growth, democracy, political stability, and freedom from corruption partially 
explain the flows of non-DAC aid (see Table 14). 
The per capita income is found to have a strong positive relationship with non-DAC aid. 
The results show that if per capita income rises by 1 percent, then non-DAC aid increases by 
2.2 percent on average ceteris paribus. It indicates a negative relationship with poverty. 
Though it is a weak measure of poverty since the data of poverty is missing for larger time in 
case of South Asia, therefore, one can simply relate the low levels of income with poverty 
(Collier and Dollar, 2002). The population significantly explains the non-DAC aid. The 
coefficient is again found negative in fixed effect estimations like pooled OLS method. If a 
population rises by 1 million, it reduces aid from non-DAC sources jointly by 0.025 percent 
on average. 
The geopolitical potential index is found to have a negative relationship with non-DAC 
aid. This is again due to variation or heterogeneity in features like population, size, or value 
of geopolitical potential across countries. Here we find the negative intercept of Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka during fixed effect estimations of non-DAC aid whereas India and 
Pakistan appear with positive intercept. The countries with relatively higher geopolitical 
potential are having positive intercepts while rest others appear negative. Therefore, due to 
low value of geopolitical potential of three out of five countries with corresponding low 
levels of aid, the relationship is found negative but actually it induces positive relation with 
high value of geopolitical potential. 
The current Account balance is having negative relationship with Non-DAC aid. The 
result shows that once currently faces negative current account balance, the non-DAC 
increases by 1.65 percent on average which indicates that donors respond to fiscal imbalances 
or recipients’ needs. 
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Democracy, political stability, and freedom from corruption have been observed partially 
significant. The results show that on average as the democracy rises (one point on scale of 0 
to 10), the non-DAC aid rises by 0.52 percent. Political stability is found to have a negative 
relationship with non-DAC aid. If political stability improves by one point, the non-DAC 
reduces by 0.32 percent on average. This indicates that countries relatively less politically 
stabled are given more weightage by non-DAC countries. Freedom from corruption, again, is 
observed partially significant with a negative relationship. If the freedom from corruption 
rises by one percentage point, then non-DAC aid falls by 0.05 percent on average. The 
countries with less freedom from corruption might have been given more aid, i.e., 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Trade openness has been observed quite significant, steadily appearing with a positive 
coefficient. The results show that if trade openness improves by one percentage point then 
non-DAC aid rises by 2.81 percent on average. 
The War on Terror (WoT) period is also found positively significant in determining 
flows of non-DAC aid. During the WoT period, the non-DAC aid rises by 1 percent on 
average. The geopolitical potential during the WoT period is given more weightage. The 
results show that once WoT period interacted with geopolitical potential index, it raises aid 
from non-DAC sources by 0.10 percent on average. 
The nuclear warheads presence represents a negative relationship with non-DAC aid, 
with partial significance. If a country possesses nuclear warheads, it reduces the aid from 
non-DAC countries jointly by 2.92 percent on average. The interaction of nuclear warheads 
presence with geopolitical potential of recipients has not been found significant while this 
interaction during the WoT period has been observed quite significant steadily in all models. 
The results depict that geopolitical potential in presence of nuclear warheads during the WoT 
period raises aid from non-DAC sources by 0.24 percent on average. Therefore, the WoT 
period is found quite important in determining the flows of aid from non-DAC countries. 
The flows of aid from DAC countries also influence the aid from non-DAC sources. The 
results show that if the DAC aid rises by 1 percentage point, then non-DAC aid rises 1.20 
percent whereas the multilateral aid has not been observed significant in determining flows of 
non-DAC aid. The domestic terrorism, in terms of high casualties from bombings, has not 
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been observed significant while during the WoT period, it is found quite significant. The 
results show that one casualty from terrorists’ bombings during the WoT leads to a 0.0012 
percent rise in non-DAC aid or hundred casualties from bombings during the WoT raises aid 
by 0.12 percent.
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                                                    Table 14: Non-DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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                                               Table 14: Non-DAC Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations (continued)
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Comparison of Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Models: 
Generally, the F-statistics in all models of fixed effects are higher than pooled OLS 
models. Therefore, we prefer fixed effects models while comparing them. 
4.3.3 Censored Tobit (Normal) Estimations 
Since some countries are having negative values of aid from non-DAC sources, which 
represents that loan payments are higher than new flows of aid, therefore, the net flows 
appear negative. We apply censored (normal) Tobit method which takes into account the 
negative values by making them to zero, and considers the positive values for estimations. 
The censored Tobit estimations using the maximum likelihood approach display significance 
of population size, geopolitical potential, freedom from corruption, democracy, stocks of 
nuclear weapons, and domestic terrorism while the political stability is found partially 
important (see Table 15). 
The coefficients derived from censored Tobit estimations using maximum likelihood 
approach can be differentiated from standard OLS methods in interpretation. The Tobit 
coefficient is not interpreted directly for determining the marginal impact of the regressor on 
the observed regressand unlike OLS because of the two main reasons: (a) the unit change in 
the value of a regressor affects the mean value of the regressand, and (b) the effect on the 
probability of observed regressand. The probability also depends on all the regressors in the 
model and their corresponding coefficients. 
However, the results directly depict the marginal impact of the variables on latent 
variable, yit*. The estimations allow us to compute the marginal impact of each regressor for 
all the observations considered in models but we focus on the earlier marginal effect of each 
regressor on latent variable rather observed regressand. Since the probability of latent 
variable ranges between 0 and 1, the ultimate impact of each variable in absolute manner will 
be smaller due to the interaction of a slope coefficient with a relatively lower value of 
probability. Our analysis will be based on the direct marginal effect of each independent 
variable on latent variable (yit*) for the positive (or desired) non-DAC economic aid instead 
of yit that covers full dataset, including non-positive values. 
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Population is observed as significantly influencing the non-DAC aid negatively. The 
results show that if a population rises by one million, the desired non-DAC aid reduces by 
almost 0.166 percent on average ceteris paribus.  
The geopolitical potential is found to have a significantly positive relationship with non-
DAC.  The estimations depict that one percent rise in geopolitical potential leads to 27 
percent rise in desired non-DAC aid on average. The impact of geopolitical on non-DAC aid 
has been observed much effective relative to other steadily significant regressors. 
Freedom from corruption has been observed significantly influencing the non-DAC aid 
negatively. The results show that one percent rise in freedom from corruption, leads to almost 
1.1 percent fall in desired non-DAC aid on average. This again indicates that countries with 
relatively higher corruption have been given more aid like Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Democracy also significantly influences the non-DAC aid. There exists a positive 
relationship between democracy and non-DAC aid. The estimations depict that one rank 
higher in democracy leads to 6.3 percent rise in desired aid from non-DAC sources on 
average. The countries which are more democratic or having relatively better democratic 
process are given higher aid by non-DAC donors. 
The stocks of nuclear weapons also indicate their significantly positive role in 
influencing the aid by non-DAC donors. The model outcomes reveal that if the countries 
stock of nuclear weapons rises by 1, then the desired non-DAC aid rises by 0.94 percent on 
average. The geopolitical potential when interacted with nuclear weapons stocks shows that it 
raises aid by 0.65 percent on average from non-DAC donors. 
Domestic terrorism has also been observed significantly positive in influencing the non-
DAC aid. The results indicate that one casualty from terrorists’ bombings leads to 0.09 
percent rise in desired non-DAC aid while during the WoT period; it raises aid by 1 percent 
on average. 
The political stability is found weaker in determining the flows of non-DAC aid. The few 
models indicate its partial significance with negative coefficient, actually displays a positive 
relationship due to a reciprocal form of this variable. 
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                                              Table 15: Non-DAC Aid - Censored Tobit (Normal) Estimations
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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                                           Table 15: Non-DAC Aid - Censored Tobit (Normal) Estimations (continued)
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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4.4 Multilateral Economic Aid 
For multilateral aid, we applied both pooled OLS and fixed effect estimation techniques 
based on homogenous and heterogeneous sample assumptions respectively. To strengthen our 
analysis and validate our results, we estimated couple of equations in either methodological 
techniques using variety of variables and their interactive forms to observe their individual 
and interactive relationship and effects on disbursement of multilateral aid. 
4.4.1 Pooled OLS Models 
The ordinary least square estimations show that geopolitical potential, DAC bilateral aid, 
political stability, democracy, economic growth, population, and nuclear weapon stockpiles 
significantly determine multilateral aid whereas the (negative) current account balance, per 
capita income, corruption, trade openness, and terrorism in recipients have been found 
insignificant (see Table 16). 
The geopolitical potential index has been steadily found significantly positive in 
determining flows of multilateral sources of aid. The results show that one percent rise in 
geopolitical potential leads to a 0.75 percent rise in multilateral aid on average ceteris 
paribus. But the effect of geopolitical potential of recipients on multilateral aid during the 
War on Terror (WoT) has been found less strong, which depicts that the multilateral agencies 
have not given much attention to geopolitical potential during the WoT compared to overall 
time span or inter-War period.  
DAC aid significantly derives the aid from multilateral sources with a positive 
relationship. On average, the results show that economic aid from multilateral sources jointly 
rises by 0.70 percent if DAC aid rises by 1 percentage point.  
Political stability has also been observed significant. The results show that there is a 
positive relationship between political stability and multilateral aid. On average, one point 
rise in political stability level (ranging between -10 to +10) can raise multilateral aid by 0.18 
percent. 
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Similarly, democracy has been found significantly negative in relationship with 
multilateral aid. The results indicate that one point lower in democracy level can raise 
multilateral aid by 0.30 percent on average. It indicates that lower level of democracy attracts 
more aid from multilateral agencies or they may require more aid for progress in democratic 
regimes to keep it stabled. On other hand, high ranks of democracy may require less funds or 
gain less attraction due to strong public opinion, accountability, and steady electoral process. 
Nuclear weapon stockpiles have also been observed significant with a negative 
relationship. If the country’s stockpile increases by 1 more nuclear weapon then the 
multilateral aid reduces by 0.05 percent. The nuclear weapon once interacted with 
geopolitical potential during War on terror, also provides negative coefficient which means it 
reduces country’s potential to receive aid from multilateral sources rather further raising it. 
Population is found to have a significantly negative relationship with multilateral aid. On 
average, if the population increases by 1 million, it reduces multilateral aid by 0.0013 
percent. 
The multilateral aid does not account the (negative) current account balance of 
economies which shows the demand for funds by recipients. Similarly, the domestic terrorism 
in recipients by bomb blasts does not influence aid from multilateral agencies. 
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                                                                 Table 16: Multilateral Aid - Pooled OLS Estimations
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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                                                     Table 16: Multilateral Aid - Pooled OLS Estimations (continued)
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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4.4.2 Fixed Effects Models 
To allow the heterogeneity in the recipients of South Asia, we also applied fixed effects 
estimations. The fixed effects models of multilateral aid report the significance of aid from 
DAC countries, trade openness, democracy, political stability, per capita income, geopolitical 
potential, economic growth, population, War on Terror period, nuclear weapons stockpiles, 
and the US alliance while corruption, domestic terrorism, and negative current account 
balance have been observed insignificant (see Table 17). 
The DAC aid significantly influences aid disbursed by multilateral sources. The results 
show that one percent rise in DAC bilateral aid raises multilateral aid by 0.75 percent on 
average ceteris paribus. 
Trade Openness has been found significant in determining flows of multilateral aid. The 
relationship of trade openness is found polynomial. Firstly, the trade openness positively 
influences multilateral aid but later starts yielding negative returns in terms of attracting 
multilateral aid. The results report that one percent rise in trade openness leads to 17 percent 
rise initially and then after a certain level, it reduces multilateral aid by 2 percent on average. 
Like pooled OLS, the democracy has been found significantly negative in relation with 
multilateral aid. The results show that one lower point in democracy levels can lead to a 0.35 
percent rise in multilateral aid on average. It indicates that multilateral agencies prefer 
countries not having well-structured democracy or may support relatively weaker 
democracies to keep them functional. 
Multilateral agencies significantly take political stability into account. The results show 
that one higher rank in political stability leads to 0.20 percent rise in multilateral aid flows on 
average.  
The geopolitical potential index is found significantly influencing the multilateral aid. 
The relationship has been observed positive. The results show that one percent rise in 
country’s geopolitical potential leads to a 2.2 percent rise in flows of multilateral aid on 
average. The geopolitical potential has been observed significantly influencing in models 
after trade openness in terms of its impact on multilateral aid. 
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The relationship between per capita income and multilateral aid is found negative which 
indicates that low income (or poor) countries are relatively preferred by multilateral agencies. 
The results depict that one percent rise in per capita income reduces multilateral aid by 0.75 
percent on average.  
The flows of multilateral aid have been found partially influenced by economic growth 
as well. The models report that on average, one percentage rise in economic growth rates 
leads to 0.18 percent rise in multilateral aid. The relationship between economic growth and 
multilateral aid has been observed relatively weaker than earlier variables. 
Population is also found partially important in influencing the aid but negatively. The 
fixed effects estimations show that one million rise in population reduces multilateral aid 
marginally by 0.005 percent on average. 
The War on Terror (WoT) period is also observed significantly positive in influencing 
the multilateral aid. The fixed effect estimations report that during the WoT period, the 
multilateral flows significantly rise by 0.40 percent on average. The geopolitical potential 
index once interacted with war on terror, significantly influences multilateral aid by 0.03 
percent on average. But the effect of geopolitical potential of countries is not that loud during 
WoT compared to its influence observed separately for the overall time span. 
Nuclear weapons stockpiles have been found significantly influencing the multilateral 
flows of aid. There exists a negative relationship between the multilateral aid and nuclear 
weapon stockpiles. If a country adds one more nuclear weapons, it significantly reduces 
multilateral aid by 0.03 percent on average but during WoT its effect is lesser with 0.009 
percent. The nuclear weapons stock when interacted with geopolitical potential marginally 
reduces the multilateral flows of aid by 0.001 percent (almost same effect during the WoT as 
well) which indicates its subtractive nature for receiving flows of aid rather additive.  
US alliance is another important factor significantly determines multilateral aid. If a 
country is a US ally, then it receives 1.05 percent more aid than a country not in alliance with 
US. The same effect has been observed during the WoT period. 
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                                                            Table 17: Multilateral Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
80 
 
                                                      Table 17: Multilateral Aid - Fixed Effects Estimations (continued)
 ***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Comparison of Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Models: 
Using the F-statistics as the yardstick to compare the models, the pooled OLS 
estimations have been found better in explanation. Therefore, we prefer our pooled OLS 
method of estimations for multilateral aid. 
4.4.3 Relation between the Bilateral Economic Aid and Multilateral 
Aid 
The vector autoregressive (VAR) model and Granger casuality test confirm that only 
bilateral aid from DAC donors is influenced by multilateral aid. There is actually no 
particular influence is being found both for bilateral aid from non-DAC donors and 
multilateral aid from other sources (see Section IV of Appendix). 
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CHATPER V 
ANALYSIS 
 
The geopolitical interests of donors have been observed significantly stronger in many studies 
especially during the Cold-War period. The literature also discerns the diminishing role of 
geopolitical interests of donors after the end of Cold War. The recent studies have witnessed 
the re-emergence of the donors’ geopolitical interests during the War on Terror (WoT). 
Out study hypothesizes that it is the geopolitical potential of recipients that attract both the 
military assistance and economic aid especially from the DAC bilateral donors during the 
post-Cold War period, which further can be distinguished between the inter-war and the WoT 
periods. We further confirm the direction of influence of both types of assistance. Our results 
conclude that it’s the bilateral economic assistance from the DAC donors that is influenced 
by the US military assistance to South Asian economies. The literature suggests that this 
directional relation captures the effect of geopolitical interests of donors influencing the 
economic assistance. Our study focuses the role of geopolitical potential of recipients that 
influences the geopolitical interests of donors both in form of military assistance as well as in 
disbursement of economic assistance from DAC and non-DAC donors and multilateral 
agencies. 
The geopolitical potential index, generally, has been observed significantly positive in 
influencing the US military aid as well as the economic aid both from bilateral (DAC and 
Non-DAC donors) and multilateral sources. The relationship between geopolitical potential 
of recipients and the US military aid as well as with bilateral economic aid from DAC donors 
is found polynomial which indicates that initially geopolitical potential of recipients attracts 
the US military aid and DAC donors as its value starts rising but eventually when a country 
becomes a powerful player or giant in the region, the DAC aid starts diminishing.  
Moreover, it suggests that when the natural and man-made resources of a recipient begins 
growing, and it drives to acquire conventional military capabilities given the suitable foreign 
defence policy and voting in favour of recipients in the United Nations (UN), the US military 
aid as well as bilateral economic aid from DAC donors responds strongly positive. Later, 
when a country reaches at adequate level of natural and man-made resources, apprehends 
efficient advantage of natural resources and geography, expands military size, and realizes 
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conventional modern military capabilities, both the US military aid and bilateral economic 
aid from DAC donors start diminishing. We also observed a strong coefficient value of 
bilateral aid from DAC donors with respect to geopolitical potential than the US military 
assistance. An important underlying reason could be the strong effect of the US military 
assistance on further development and modernisation of military capabilities, which is a 
component of geopolitical potential. Though this is beyond the scope of this study but seems 
important in explaining the dynamics of geopolitical potential. A further research can be 
conducted on military capabilities and its dynamics with respect to geopolitical potential 
since there is no such empirical study has been carried out yet to explain this behaviour in 
discipline of strategic aid. 
Hence, these developments along with infrastructural improvement nurtures the geopolitical 
potential to further heights which induces less scope of aid after a certain level, i.e. India. 
These couple of features or few of them once starts rising consistently, can be held 
responsible for leaving the geopolitical potential into a phase of diminishing returns of both 
the military assistance from the US and the overall economic aid from DAC donors.  
 Applying this phenomenon in South Asia, we find that India is a leading player in the region 
as its geopolitical potential is far higher than any country followed by Pakistan (five times 
lesser than India), Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Therefore, India has not been given 
much aid by DAC donors on average from 1991 till 2013 with respect to its greater 
geopolitical potential while Pakistan received 26 percent less aid than India from DAC 
donors compared to its five times lesser value of geopolitical potential. Similarly, Bangladesh 
received 17 percent lesser aid on average from DAC donors than Pakistan compared to its 3.3 
times lesser value of geopolitical potential to Pakistan. Further, Nepal received just five 
percent less aid than Sri Lanka compared to its forty percent less value of geopolitical 
potential to Sri Lanka.  
India seems progressing in almost all components of the geopolitical potential index. Overall, 
its geopolitical potential has almost risen by 65% since 1991 compared to Bangladesh (43%), 
Pakistan (32%), and Sri Lanka (49%). Nepal being very small has shown some performance 
in raising its geopolitical potential by 73 percent in mean time. Indian military size has 
expanded by more than 2.25 times during our study period (from 1990 till 2013). On 
technological front, it has equipped itself with modern conventional capabilities along with 
strategic modernization of nuclear weapons. The recent leap in space has made it most 
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distinguishable in the developing world. Since, its economy size has grown by 6.27 times 
(627 percent) while its military expenditures have not witnessed substantial reduction, i.e., 
dropping from 2.9 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP. In absolute terms, the military expenditures 
have grown much higher which has contributed in modernization of its military resources by 
relying both on domestic resources and imports, to strengthen its hegemony in the region. 
India has also raised its production of natural resources notably coal and petroleum. Coal and 
petroleum productions have experienced growth of 256 percent and 53 percent respectively in 
our study period. It has also shown performance in taking advantage from the natural 
resources, i.e., electricity production has grown up 332 percent. Importantly, we are just 
discussing the variables which we considered in our factor analysis based upon common 
features. Apart from these features, India is important for the production of the critical 
elements due to its wide-ranging natural resources like Copper, Iron, Uranium, etc. India also 
doubled its Uranium production in mean time. Similarly, it also produces gold which is not 
found in rest of South Asia.  
The infrastructure has been found improved during this course like sea ports and air ports 
have increased in numbers. Further, roadways and railroads lengths have also witnessed 
growth. The roadways length has become more than doubled. On diplomatic fronts, India 
carries a higher rank in political globalization. For twice, it became the member of United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). The large country with a large population has also 
performed well in reducing poverty and raising its human development score by 36 percent in 
last two decades. In South Asia, India is ranked 3rd in human development index (HDI) after 
Maldives and Sri Lanka. Therefore, when a country reaches at a stage of geopolitical 
potential where it starts taking advantage of natural and man-made resources efficiently and 
makes progress on other fronts, it shows the donors its powerful angle due to substantially 
higher geopolitical potential more than its deprivation that requires aid. While the countries 
with relatively less geopolitical potential but making some progress, and still carrying much 
poverty and deprivation, they attract donors more due to their mixed pattern of geopolitical 
potential and deprivation of development. 
Pakistan is still in a phase of attracting donors due to its mixed pattern of geopolitical 
potential and poverty or deprivation of development. Though it has made progress in making 
its military capabilities on modern footings, achieved strategic nuclear capabilities due to 
regional strategic power-play and threats but on other fronts, it has not shown much 
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performance on utilization of its natural resources. The basic infrastructure development and 
poverty reduction are still main challenges. Of course, the external factors would definitely 
have played their roles like military coups, political instability, corruption, terrorism, etc. The 
coal production has just witnessed a rise of 6 percent from 1991 till 2013. The electricity 
production has increased by 2.34 times (234 percent) compared to 3.32 time increment in 
India. Since 2008, Pakistan has been facing historically higher power outages. Though it also 
possesses some of the critical elements, transmission channels like supply pipelines of oil and 
gas, and water channels as well but so far has not succeeded much in better utilization of its 
resources. The railroad track has further seen reduction while roadways length rises by just 
47 percent in mean time. Similarly, there is no as such advancement in air ports and sea ports. 
Recently, it has made Gawadar port functional under Sino-Pak trade and strategic agreements. 
Compared to very large India, Pakistan has not shown much performance in reducing poverty 
in our study period. Presently, its Human Development Index (HDI) score is lowest in South 
Asia. Therefore, the mixed patterns of geopolitical potential and poverty still keeps the 
economy in phase of increasing patterns of aid disbursement. Once, the geopolitical potential 
will be overwhelming and poverty picture starts becoming blurred, then it will not be 
attracting donors much given its better performance in other features of geopolitical potential. 
Then, the disbursement of aid could easily be distinguishable as purely for developmental 
reasons. That stage may also reflect the transition of a recipient to a donor. 
The nuclear warheads presence and stockpiles have not been found significant in case of 
DAC donors in our pooled OLS models but fixed effect models indicate the positive relation 
between warheads presence and DAC aid. Interestingly, the geopolitical potential has not 
been found significant during the WoT period. This indicates that donors paid more attention 
to their own geopolitical interests rather responding to recipients’ potential. We captured the 
donors’ own geopolitical interests by the US alliance which has been found significant for the 
WoT period. Further, both the pooled OLS and fixed effect models indicate that even if the 
recipient country either possesses nuclear warheads or has a policy of growing stock of 
nuclear weapons, being US ally (during the WoT), it helps to receive aid from DAC donors. 
Hence, the US alliance is an important factor determining the donors’ interests since most of 
the key DAC donors are also in alliance with US under NATO.  
The role of key DAC donors is also found important in influencing the flows of multilateral 
aid. The US alliance is again found much important and positively affects the multilateral aid 
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during the WoT period. The nuclear weapons’ stockpiles which alone negatively affects the 
multilateral aid when interacted with the US alliance (during the WoT period) brings positive 
changes in flows of multilateral aid due to strong influence of geopolitical interests of DAC 
donors which contribute into the funding channels of multilateral agencies. 
The economic interests of DAC donors measured by their share in recipients’ imports have 
not been found important in influencing aid. In fact, significantly opposite relation has been 
observed in disbursement of aid by DAC donors. The results indicate that if the share of few 
main DAC donors (Germany, France, Japan, UK and US) in imports of South Asian 
recipients increase, aid from DAC donors reduces.  
Similarly, the aid from non-DAC donors is also found to be positively influenced by the 
geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients. Both the pooled OLS and censored Tobit 
models indicate a strong positive relationship between them. The WoT period is found 
strongly negative in case of non-DAC aid which indicates that it negatively influences non-
DAC aid whereas for DAC aid, this period effect has not been found playing any significant 
role other than when interacted with US alliance. The geopolitical potential is found so strong 
when it is interacted with either nuclear weapon stockpiles or WoT or both of them, it 
significantly approves the positive relationship. The pooled OLS and fixed effect models 
indicate a negative relationship between non-DAC aid and presence of nuclear weapons alone 
but once interacted with geopolitical potential it plays a positive role in influencing the non-
DAC aid due to overwhelming effect of geopolitical potential. Tobit estimations indicate that 
growing stock of nuclear weapons positively affects the aid from non-DAC donors.  
Like DAC aid, we again find something interesting in patters of non-DAC aid to South Asian 
economies. Generally, there is a positive relationship between geopolitical potential of the 
South Asian recipients and non-DAC aid with some outlier as well, i.e. India. The average 
aid received by India from non-DAC donors during the period 1991 to 2013, is found 
negative 7.5 million dollars which means the fresh flows of aid from non-DAC donors are 
lesser than the payments of existing loans. The geopolitical potential of India is relatively 
much larger than many of the non-DAC donors, which explains the reduction in aid due to its 
greater geopolitical potential like a polynomial relation with DAC aid, diminishing after 
reaching a certain height. The relative capacity of non-DAC donors is quite lesser compared 
to DAC donors, therefore, their height of geopolitical potential phasing diminishing returns is 
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probably much lesser. Further, this indicates the new emerging role of India by joining the 
club of non-DAC donors. 
The Multilateral aid from different agencies has also been observed positively influenced by 
the geopolitical potential. The significantly positive role of geopolitical potential is also 
observed during the WoT. Surprisingly, the WoT period effect has been found significantly 
positive only in the multilateral aid disbursement. The literature highlights the strong role of 
main donors in IMF and World Bank lending decisions. Further, the multilateral aid agencies 
significantly reduce aid on either presence of nuclear weapons or their growing stocks. The 
nuclear weapons’ stockpiles when interacted with geopolitical potential indicates marginal 
reduction in aid by multilateral agencies either the inter-War or the WoT period. The 
countries with growing stocks of nuclear weapons receive marginally lesser aid compared to 
those which do not possess nuclear weapons. 
Since, the bilateral aid disbursed by DAC donors to South Asian countries has remained 
higher than multilateral as well as bilateral aid from non-DAC donors. The polynomial 
relationship of geopolitical potential both with US military aid and bilateral aid from DAC 
donors, estimated in OLS method, has not been seen statistically significant in case of non-
DAC donors and multilateral aid either due to relatively less strong relationship with 
geopolitical potential or lower volumes of aid. The graphical representation of scatter plots 
does not allow polynomial mathematical form of geopolitical potential in models. 
Nevertheless, the fixed effect estimations do not produce quadratic (or non-linear) 
relationship due to modelling issues and time-variant (feature of) geopolitical potential. 
Trade openness has been seen significant in influencing aid disbursed by non-DAC donors 
and multilateral agencies. The DAC donors do not take trade openness into account much to 
advance aid. The relationship is found polynomial between trade openness and multilateral 
aid. It indicates that as country moves more towards trade liberalization, aid from multilateral 
sources starts increasing but after a certain level, it starts diminishing. This might indicate the 
realization of returns of trade openness at a certain level which reduces the further scope of 
aid disbursement. 
Economic performance measured by growth rates is found significant in influencing aid from 
DAC donors and multilateral agencies whereas in case of non-DAC donors, it has been seen 
partially significant. The relationship is found positive between economic performance and 
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aid disbursed by DAC donors and multilateral organizations while non-DAC donors behave 
oppositely which means that during poor economic performance, they help the South Asian 
recipients. 
The bilateral aid from DAC donors is also influenced positively by non-DAC aid and 
multilateral disbursement while the multilateral aid is influenced only by the aid from DAC 
donors. The non-DAC bilateral economic aid is significantly influenced by multilateral aid 
and partially by DAC aid. Further, we checked the direction of relationship from VAR 
models and Granger Casuality tests, which confirm that bilateral aid disbursed by DAC 
donors follows multilateral aid whereas multilateral and bilateral aid from non-DAC donors 
do not consider aid from other sources. We also observed that DAC aid follows US military 
assistance to South Asia using VAR and Granger Casuality tests. Hence, the bilateral aid 
from DAC donors is more reactive in making lending decisions based on other sources of aid 
(see sections III and IV of Appendix). 
Population also seems important in determining aid from all sources but the relationship 
varies across donors. Only DAC donors positively respond to rise in population while non-
DAC donors and multilateral agencies negatively account population growth.  
The recipients’ economic need measured by current account deficit is found significant only 
in non-DAC aid while for DAC aid and multilateral aid, it is observed insignificant. The 
relationship between non-DAC aid and current account balance (dummy 1 for positive, 0 
otherwise) is negative, indicating a positive relationship between a deficit situation and aid 
disbursement. Therefore, the non-DAC donors respond to fiscal problems of South Asian 
recipients while the DAC donors and multilateral agencies do not take it into account. 
Remarkably, we observe a negative relation between freedom from corruption and bilateral 
aid both from DAC and non-DAC donors whereas in case of multilateral aid, it is found 
insignificant. Comparatively, for DAC bilateral economic aid, it is found partially significant 
while strong effect has been observed in non-DAC aid. This indicates that the bilateral donors 
give more aid to those countries have low scores of freedom from corruption (or have high 
scores of corruption). 
Democracy is found to be positively correlated with non-DAC economic aid whereas 
negatively associated with multilateral aid. The results indicates that if the country moves 
more towards strong democracy then bilateral economic aid from non-DAC donors increases 
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whereas the multilateral aid decreases. In South Asia, the multilateral aid has been given 
more to countries with low ranks of democracy or with autocratic rule. Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka in South Asia have faced political instability due to power struggle between 
military and democratic institutions. The negative relationship can also be traced from the 
literature on democracy (or autocracy) and aid. Knack (2004) finds no association between 
aid and change in democracy. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) find that multilateral aid has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the political regime of recipients. Foreign aid 
supports autocratic rule in maintaining power, reduces government efficiency, and promotes 
corruption. Further, it generates a revenue flow that promotes rent-seeking activities and 
powerful people engage in rent-seeking activities for their personal benefits. Hence, aid 
assists autocratic regime to continue and take unpopular decisions (Mesquita & Smith, 2009). 
Since, this study investigates aid from geopolitical perspectives, Kersting and Kilby (2014), 
view democratic conditionality not significant for advancing aid to strategically important 
countries. 
Political stability is found significant in influencing multilateral aid while partial significance 
has been observed in disbursement of bilateral aid from non-DAC donors. The relationship is 
found positive both with bilateral aid from non-DAC donors and multilateral aid. 
We also observed the importance of per capita income in determination of bilateral aid from 
non-DAC donors and multilateral aid. The results exhibit that the bilateral aid from non-DAC 
aid increases with a rise in per capita income of South Asian recipients. The relationship has 
been witnessed partially significant. In case of multilateral aid, the relationship is found 
strongly negative which indicates that the multilateral agencies give more aid to countries 
with low per capita income, and specifies their (primary) objective to disburse aid to poor 
countries for their development. The poor or low-income countries are being preferred by 
multilateral agencies as compared to bilateral donors. One can argue that this is an average 
measure of poverty. The poverty data for South Asian countries is missing for larger time 
hence, for a simple analysis; we can observe the relationship for poverty purpose like Collier 
and Dollar (2002) measure the poverty reduction (by per capita income) due to aid allocation. 
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CHATPER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This study confirms that geopolitics has remained significant in influencing both bilateral aid 
(from DAC and non-DAC donors) and multilateral aid. It measures the geopolitical potential 
of South Asian countries by developing an index based upon common features using factor 
analysis. Based upon OLS estimations, we conclude that the bilateral aid from DAC donors 
has been significantly influenced by geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients. The 
relationship has been observed polynomial, which indicates that initially aid rises with 
growth in geopolitical potential but eventually starts falling due to overpowering status of 
geopolitical potential along with blurred picture of poverty and deprivation. This stage also 
indicates the aid disbursement purely based on developmental objectives. Further, it takes the 
economy towards the donors club rather recipient.  
The empirical findings suggest a stronger effect of geopolitical potential on bilateral 
economic aid than the US military assistance. A potential reason could be the robust effect of 
military assistance on raising military capabilities which further raises geopolitical potential. 
The results show the War on Terror (WoT) period effect to be insignificant with regard to aid 
disbursement by DAC donors. The geopolitical potential of South Asian recipients have not 
been found significant during the WoT while the donor’s geopolitical interests are found 
significant in influencing aid during the WoT. Therefore, we can conclude that the bilateral 
aid from DAC donors has always been associated with geopolitics, either the geopolitical 
potential of recipients or donors’ own geopolitical interests, have remained significantly 
influential in deriving aid.  
Likewise, the bilateral aid from non-DAC donors has been found significantly subjective to 
the geopolitical potential of the South Asian recipients. The OLS and censored Tobit (normal) 
models indicate that the geopolitical potential of recipients have remained important in 
influencing aid from non-DAC donors. The WoT period effect has been found expressively 
negative while its interaction with geopolitical potential is found positive due to 
overwhelming role of geopolitical potential of recipients. Relative to DAC donors, the 
strength and capacity of advancing aid for non-DAC donors is quite lower; therefore, their 
height phasing the negative relationship with aid is substantially lower. Due to very large 
geopolitical potential, India has experienced a negative aid from non-DAC donors on average. 
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This indicates India’s higher geopolitical potential size relative to non-DAC donors, and 
further defines its recent emerging role as a donor by joining the club of non-DAC donors. 
The multilateral aid also follows a significantly positive relationship with geopolitical 
potential. The WoT period effect has been witnessed significantly positive only in 
multilateral aid disbursement to South Asia. The OLS and fixed effect models also suggest 
the significance of geopolitical potential during the WoT. We also introduced the role of 
geopolitical interests of donors as the literature suggests that main DAC donors also influence 
the multilateral aid. Our study confirms that geopolitical potential of recipients has been 
stronger in influencing the multilateral aid compared to geopolitical interests of main donors 
affecting funding of multilateral agencies while during the WoT, the role of geopolitical 
interests of donors in influencing multilateral funds is observed more profound. 
From the empirical findings, we conclude that, overall, the non-developmental objectives of 
aid have remained stronger in case of South Asia, in the post-Cold War era, founded either on 
the geopolitical potential of the recipients or donors- based on their respective geopolitical 
interests. 
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APPENDIX 
 
I. List of Donors 
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II. Robustness Checks: 
In this section, we will be checking out the strength of our bilateral and multilateral aid 
models according to classical regression assumptions. First of all, we will discuss 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, residuals’ normality and then heteroscedasticity to 
determine the health of our results. Following classical regression assumptions, we found our 
models unbiased as well as efficient generally. Later, this appendix section covers the 
stationarity status of our concerned variables. Sections III shows vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model and Granger Casuality test of US military aid and DAC economic aid whereas section 
IV covers VAR models and Granger Casuality test for DAC economic aid, Non-DAC 
economic aid, and multilateral aid respectively. 
a. Multicollinearity: 
We observed some high multicollinearity cases among few variables accordingly to our 
expectations (Table 18). Each strong case is being discussed here under. 
At first, high multicollinearity has been observed between democracy and political stability. 
We used the data from Polity IV project developed by Centre for Systematic Peace. Both the 
variables have some strong relationship in the construction phase. Political stability (Polity) 
variable has been derived by subtracting score of autocracy from democracy. Democracy is 
an eleven point scaled indicator based upon openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, constraints of chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. The 
modified version of political stability (Polity2) is designed for time series analyses 
completely based upon standard political stability (Polity) indicator, derived from difference 
between democracy and autocracy. Therefore, we expected some strong multicollinearity 
between these two variables. 
A classic example of multicollinearity between income and population has been seen in our 
models too. A great amount of literature describes the relation between income and 
population. A large population leads to high income. If population is given some level of 
education or they equip themselves with training and skills then a level of human capital 
raises thus provides more returns to productivity and income. The large population leads to a 
large number of doctors, engineers, scientists, researchers, and other skilled personals. Even 
low level of skills provide labor role in production due to volume. The mixed pattern of 
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general labor and high skilled labor can be considered for South Asian countries for their 
contribution in production and income respectively. 
A few more strong multicollinearities have been seen among income and geopolitical 
potential, population and geopolitical potential, and geopolitical potential and nuclear 
weapons. The literature based on determining strategic interests of donors has taken 
population and income separately.  Of course, income determines the economic strength or 
capacity at national or individual level in per capita terms. It also derives the economic 
deprivation or poverty and determines the response of donors to low levels of income in order 
to establish its developmental objectives. Therefore, we considered it separately as most of 
the studies have taken it. Similarly, population has been taken separately in most of the 
studies to determine its significance in determining aid targeting larger population, which 
may also be the reason for economic deprivation due to lack of resources. 
Both income and population are considered as important sources determining geopolitical 
potential. They can also be interpreted in forms of ‘capital’ and ‘labor’ inputs for the 
geopolitical potential respectively. The studies carried out on determining the national power 
featuring geopolitical potential have considered these two important sources. Friedensburg 
(1936), Wright (1955), German (1960), Singer (1972), Fucks (1978), and Beckman (1984) 
have strongly recommended population as an important source determining national power. 
German (1960), Alcock and Newcombe (1970), Ferris (1973), Cline (1975) and Zarghani et 
al. (2008) have used income as an important factor to derive the national power. Teclean 
(2010) also used population and income to measure the geopolitical potential. Similarly, few 
studies like German (1960) and Beckman (1984) have considered nuclear capabilities as an 
important source of national power. Recently, Reynaud and Vauday (2009) used nuclear 
capabilities to determine the geopolitical potential of recipients influencing the IMF lending. 
Therefore, depending upon their individual significance and their relevant scope, we 
considered income, population, and nuclear capabilities separately. Though, they all are 
important sources of geopolitical potential but have been taken distinctly to determine their 
individual behaviour that significantly varies across donors as our models suggest. 
We also found high multicollinearity between the US military aid and US alliance. The US 
military aid is being disbursed to those countries having strategic or defence agreements or in 
alliance with the United States.  
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Another high multicollinearity has been observed between US alliance and high casualty 
terrorist bombings or incidents per year. Since Pakistan has been in alliance with US, and has 
faced terrorist attacks after it made military operations as per US demand in its North 
Western territory against extremists which led a rise in massive bombings in countryside. The 
critics observe it as a reaction of the military operations under the US alliance in northern 
territory.  
We have used variety of variables for each factor in our models for different purposes like 
current account dummy (1 for positive or 0 otherwise) and current account balance (percent 
of GDP), nuclear warheads presence (1 for presence, 0 otherwise) and nuclear stockpiles (for 
progress and growth), high casualty terrorists’ bombings deaths and incidents per year 
(frequency), therefore, some high collinearity has been seen in these variables. Since these 
variables have been taken separately in different models, therefore, they are not relevant. 
a. Autocorrelation: 
The autocorrelation is a serious problem in time series analysis that makes your results 
inefficient. It simply describes the correlated error terms over time. Our results generally 
indicate the absence of autocorrelation between error terms. Almost all the Durbin-Watson d 
statistics obtained in different models were later analysed as falling in non-rejection of our 
null hypothesis, i.e. there is no autocorrelation, except few models17 in Non-DAC OLS fixed 
effect estimations.  
The Durbin Watson d-statistics is obtained by: 
 
𝑑𝑑 = ∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1)2𝑡𝑡=𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=2
∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡)2𝑡𝑡=𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1  
 
It is basically the ratio of sum of squared differences in residuals to the residuals sum of 
squares. The degree of freedom in numerator is n-1 as it subtracts one observation in 
measuring differences of residuals. The d -statistic ranges between 0 and 4. 
                                                 
17 Models VII, VIII and IX in fixed effect estimations of Non-DAC Aid  
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Later, we used these d-statistics to determine the status of autocorrelation in residuals of our 
estimated models. We used the following criteria for non-rejection of our null hypothesis 
which states that residuals have no autocorrelation. 
Non-rejection Area: 
d ˃ dU, α/2 
or (4- d) ˃ dU, α/2 
while the rejection phase has following criteria 
d ˂ dL, α/2 
or 4- d) ˂ dL, α/2 
Using these formulae, we reach to conclusion that our models generally have no 
autocorrelation in their residuals. The rejection of null hypothesis indicates that results are 
inefficient but not biased. 
For example, the OLS model I of DAC Aid, we measure the non-rejection status by 
following method. 
(4- d) ˃ dU, α/2 
(4-1.0944) > 1.83203 
2.9056 > 1.83203 
Therefore, we do no reject null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in residuals. 
 
b. Residuals Normality: 
The most important parameter to look the empirical results is based upon the normality of 
their residuals. There are couple of indicators to measure the normality of the residuals but 
we used Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics to determine the residuals’ normality. The formula is 
given here under: 
JB = n [S2/6 + (K-3)2 / 24] ~ χ22 
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Where n is a sample size, S stands for skewness, while K is kurtosis coefficient. We use the 
chi-square distribution to measure the p-value of the JB test statistics to determine its 
significance. 
Since the null hypothesis is residuals normality, if the p-value of JB test is found closer to 
zero and less than 0.05, we reject the null- hypothesis. Alternatively, if the JB test probability 
exceeds 0.05, we do not reject null hypothesis and states that residuals are normal. The 
rejection of residuals normality indicates the biased results. 
Our all models of US military aid, bilateral aid from DAC and non-DAC donors and 
multilateral aid in all forms report the normality of residuals since the JB tests p-values are 
greater than 0.05. 
c. Residuals Heteroscedasticity: 
Another important feature that questions the efficiency of the results is residuals’ 
homoscedasticity. The classical linear regressions assume that the error terms have 
homoscedasticity which means equal variance across observations.  
We used Breusch-Pagan (BP) test to determine the residuals’ homo or heteroscedasticity 
status. Our all models of aid either bilateral or multilateral indicate the equal variance or 
homoscedasticity in their residuals since their BP tests’ p-values are greater than 0.05, which 
indicates the non-rejection of null hypothesis, i.e. residuals have equal variance across 
observations. 
d. Stationarity: 
The classical regression models considering time series data should be based upon 
stationarity status which means mean and variance stand constant over time and covariance 
depends only upon the distance between the periods under consideration. If the time series 
models use non-stationarity series of variables, then such regression is termed as spurious 
regression. In case of non-stationarity, other measures like autoregressive or error correlation 
models are applied. 
Since most of the variables are found stationary, that allowed us to apply OLS regression 
models. The very few variables were initially found non-stationary, but later turned stationary 
by taking log forms. We used Levin, Lin and Chu, and PP-Fisher Chi-square tests to confirm 
the stationarity status of concerned variables. A few variables were found non-stationary 
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which later turned stationary by taking their first differences and using such forms in our 
models, e.g. trade, per capita income, US ally, and War on Terror. The following table shows 
the stationarity status of variables being used in models.  
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Table 19: Unit Root Tests 
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III. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model of US Military Aid and Bilateral DAC 
Aid 
Table 20: Vector Autoregressive Models 
           VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE ESTIMATES 
  
 
  
  DAC AID US MIL AID 
C 129.4448*** 31290543* 
DAC AID(-1) 0.793386*** -27799.35 
DAC AID (-2) 0.016273 -10303.19 
US MIL AID (-1) 0.00000103*** 0.958729*** 
US MIL AID (-2) -0.000000781* -0.115773 
  
 
  
  
 
  
R-squared 0.72144 0.66427 
Adj. R-squared 0.70971 0.65013 
F-Statistics 61.5099 46.99141 
***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 21: Granger Casuality between US Military Aid and Bilateral DAC Economic Aid 
VAR GRANGER CAUSALITY/ BLOCK EXOGENEITY WALD TESTS 
  
  
  
Sample: 1991 2013 
 
  
Included observations: 100 
 
  
  
  
  
Dependent variable: DAC_AID 
 
  
  
  
  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
US_MIL_AID  7.219229 2  0.0271 
All  7.219229 2  0.0271 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Dependent variable: US_MIL_AID 
 
  
  
  
  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DAC_AID  2.506601 2  0.2856 
All  2.506601 2  0.2856 
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IV. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Models: DAC Aid, Non-DAC Aid, and 
Multilateral Aid 
        Table 22: VAR Models     
Vector Autoregression Estimations   
standard errors in ( ) and t-statistics in [ ]   
  LDACAID LNONDACAID LMULTIAID 
  
  
  
LDACAID(-1)  0.767857*** -0.074829  0.110626 
   (0.11858)  (0.38227)  (0.22009) 
  [ 6.47546] [-0.19575] [ 0.50265] 
  
  
  
LDACAID(-2)  0.031181 -0.005178 -0.06178 
   (0.08051)  (0.25953)  (0.14942) 
  [ 0.38731] [-0.01995] [-0.41347] 
  
  
  
LNONDACAID(-1) -0.026707  0.731539***  0.061909 
   (0.04999)  (0.16117)  (0.09279) 
  [-0.53420] [ 4.53904] [ 0.66720] 
  
  
  
LNONDACAID(-2)  0.024060  0.131093 -0.060219 
   (0.04679)  (0.15085)  (0.08685) 
  [ 0.51417] [ 0.86903] [-0.69337] 
  
  
  
LMULTIAID(-1) -0.127408 -0.124836  0.291114* 
   (0.08503)  (0.27410)  (0.15781) 
  [-1.49844] [-0.45543] [ 1.84469] 
  
  
  
LMULTIAID(-2)  0.250111***  0.195827  0.331864** 
   (0.08440)  (0.27209)  (0.15665) 
  [ 2.96328] [ 0.71971] [ 2.11845] 
  
  
  
C  0.647498  0.414308  1.956006** 
   (0.49553)  (1.59744)  (0.91971) 
  [ 1.30668] [ 0.25936] [ 2.12677] 
  
  
  
 R-squared  0.841982  0.740762  0.527140 
 Adj. R-squared  0.817032  0.699830  0.452478 
 Sum sq. resids  3.359455  34.91253  11.57266 
 S.E. equation  0.297333  0.958515  0.551855 
 F-statistic  33.74657  18.09725  7.060352 
 Log likelihood -5.467348 -58.14136 -33.29686 
 Akaike AIC  0.554104  2.895171  1.790971 
 Schwarz SC  0.835141  3.176208  2.072008 
 ***, **, * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 23: VAR Residual Normality Tests 
 
Table 24: Granger Casuality among DAC Aid, Non-DAC Aid, and Multilateral Aid 
VAR Granger Causality / Block Exogeneity  Wald Tests 
Sample: 1991 2013 
  
  
  
   
  
Dependent variable: LDACAID 
 
  
  
   
  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.   
  
   
  
LNONDACAID  0.306531 2  0.8579   
LMULTIAID  8.856179 2  0.0119   
  
   
  
All  9.150358 4  0.0574   
  
   
  
  
   
  
Dependent variable: LNONDACAID 
 
  
  
   
  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.   
  
   
  
LDACAID  0.065943 2  0.9676   
LMULTIAID  0.520080 2  0.7710   
  
   
  
All  0.529437 4  0.9706   
  
   
  
  
   
  
Dependent variable: LMULTIAID 
 
  
  
   
  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.   
  
   
  
  
   
  
LDACAID  0.274188 2  0.8719   
LNONDACAID  0.516305 2  0.7725   
  
   
  
All  1.389628 4  0.8460   
 
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  11.10632 2  0.0639
2  1.570023 2  0.4561
3  0.117062 2  0.9431
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
